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JULY, 1969

U.S. Military Commitments in Europe and the Middle East

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CURRENT History

JULY, 1969

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In this second issue of our series on the United States military commitment, eight articles trace United States involvement in the wars and power struggles of Europe and the Middle East. Our first author, reviewing United States-European conflicts and alliances before 1918, points out that "European and world 'power politics' affected [Americans] vitally . . . throughout all their history."

The U. S. and Europe to 1918

BY WILLIAM G. CARLETON

Professor Emeritus of History, University of Florida

FOR ROUGHLY HALF their history (1607–1783) Americans were subjects of the British empire, inextricably involved in English trading patterns and European wars and politics. The colonists actively participated in England's Dutch wars of the seventeenth century and in her first four great imperialist wars with France, which took place at intervals from 1689 to 1763.

Even America's national independence was in large part a by-product of the European balance of power. Because of their conflicts of interest with Britain and in order to settle old scores, the French went to war with Britain during the American Revolution (1775–1783), and gave the Americans decisive military, naval and financial assistance.

CONTINUED DEEP EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT, 1783–1815

After the Revolution, the United States sought commercial treaties with various continental European countries, but it was not easy to breach their closed mercantilist systems. However, Great Britain caused Americans their chief concern, for most American

trade was still conducted with the British. Britain blocked the Americans from the trading privileges within the empire they had enjoyed as subjects of that empire, refused to negotiate a commercial treaty with them, and made it difficult for them to revive their lucrative trade with the British West Indies. Moreover, the Americans soon discovered that the European colonies adjacent to them would cause trouble, and that the United States was still enmeshed in the European balance of power. The English in Canada harassed them, refused to surrender the forts and posts along the southern shores of the Great Lakes (in territory indisputably American) and sought to erect an Indian buffer state in that area in the interest of Canadian fur traders. The Spanish in Louisiana and the Floridas also badgered the Americans, falsely claimed territory north of West Florida, fomented the Indians against them, and closed the mouth of the Mississippi River to American trade. Thus American frontiersmen in the trans-Appalachian country were cut off from their only feasible trading outlet.

Interestingly, it became clear that the gov-

ernment of the new republic, virtually a league of independent states under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1789), was too weak. Advocates of a stronger union under a federal form of government argued that such a government was necessary to enable the young country to assert its sovereignty in its own Great Lakes-Ohio-Mississippi region and to win commercial concessions from England and other countries. These arguments carried great weight in the adoption (in 1787–1788) of the United States Constitution. Thus again the impact of Europe on America was decisive.

The new federal government, under President George Washington, succeeded in negotiating the Jay Treaty with Britain (1794), in which the English promised to surrender the American forts and posts along the Great Lakes and concede to the United States an entering wedge in the British West Indies trade. Washington also concluded the favorable Pinckney Treaty with Spain (1795), in which that country relinquished her territorial claims north of West Florida, opened free navigation of the Mississippi River to Americans, and granted them the right to deposit their exports and imports at New Orleans pending reshipment. The United States economy, which had been in the doldrums since the Revolution, also improved markedly after 1793.

Although much of the credit for the upturn in American fortune was attributed to the strength of the new government, even more important was the impact of Europe. Beginning in 1793, England and France were engaged in a desperate conflict known as the War of the French Revolution and, despite their mutual blockades, their wartime demands for American goods sent United States foreign trade soaring, bringing the United States its first sustained post-revolutionary prosperity. It was the exigencies of this war which had prodded Britain into the Jay Treaty and Spain into the Pinckney Treaty, thus freeing American soil from foreign domination.

The War of the French Revolution, however, posed a critical dilemma for United

States diplomacy. The treaty of alliance with France, made during the American Revolution, still stood; and the French expected the United States to enter the war on their side or at least to pursue a policy of benevolent neutrality. But President Washington felt that his young country's interest would be best served by genuine neutrality and that it could not afford to waste its slender resources. Heated factionalism within the country indicated the wisdom of neutrality. The followers of Thomas Jefferson ardently supported the French Revolution. But the followers of Alexander Hamilton, the Federalists—including the commercial classes who feared that Revolution intensely and valued trading ties with Britain—fanatically opposed "Jacobin France." Accordingly, in 1793, Washington issued his famous Proclamation of Neutrality. The disappointed French retaliated by letting loose their privateers and cruisers on American shipping not headed for France. Out of these difficulties came Washington's Farewell Address (1796), in which he counseled Americans to steer clear of permanent alliances and to put their trust in temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. This, however, was a far cry from isolation.

By the time John Adams became President in 1797, relations with France had become critical. The French, angered still more by the Jay Treaty, had stepped up their warfare on United States shipping. Adams sent a three-man mission to France to patch up the differences, but the mission was insulted by the French in the notorious XYZ Affair of 1797–1798. American opinion turned sharply against the French and an undeclared naval war between the United States and France followed. The Federalists were gleeful, believing that the time had come for an Anglo-American alliance, overt or tacit. By this time, Spain and Holland were allies of France; hence Great Britain was fighting three naval, commercial and colonial powers. Despite recent naval victories, Great Britain was in deadly peril, for if the major fleets of two or three of her enemies managed to escape the British blockade they might still join forces and overpower the British navy.

Great Britain had taken advantage of this war with her chief commercial and colonial rivals to penetrate their colonies and trading monopolies.

Her navy and merchant marine were growing by leaps and bounds, and she was in desperate need of American seamen to man them. Thus the Federalists reasoned that this was the time to join Britain in despoiling the French, the Dutch and particularly the neighboring Spanish of their trade and colonies, allowing the young United States, with breathtaking speed, to become a great commercial and colonial power. But President Adams would have none of this grandiose scheme. When the war in continental Europe took a turn less favorable to the French, he sent a minister to France who negotiated a peaceful American-French settlement in 1800. The Hamiltonian Federalists never forgave Adams. The main significance of this 1797-1800 crisis is often neglected—that a great many of the commercial interests in the Northeastern states did not look to a United States continental destiny but instead envisaged the United States as a maritime and colonial power, permanently involved to the hilt in European and world affairs.

In 1800, France's new ruler, Napoleon Bonaparte, sandbagged Spain into ceding Louisiana—the vast territory between the Mississippi and the Rockies—to France. When this news belatedly reached the United States, there was great alarm, for weak Spain's possession of Louisiana was one thing, its possession by powerful France was another matter altogether. President Jefferson let it be known that should Napoleon actually take possession of New Orleans, the United States would be forced to marry itself to the British fleet and nation, thus admitting that the United States would be compelled to adopt the policy of the Hamiltonian Federalists and permanently involve itself in the European and world balance of power on the side of England.

In 1803, for a variety of reasons, Napoleon sold all of Louisiana to the United States at a bargain price. Thus New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi fell to the Americans

and the free navigation of the Mississippi was assured. The American flag was planted on the Rockies; the territory of the United States was increased by 140 per cent; the destiny of the country would be further diverted from Europe and the Atlantic to the interior of the North American continent; and the policy known as the Monroe Doctrine would later emerge.

The duel between Great Britain and France took a new turn from 1805 to 1807, when Napoleon completely upset the European balance of power. By 1807, he controlled every country on the continent, and from 1807 to 1812, only Great Britain held out against him. In this mortal combat, England blockaded the European continent and sought to seize neutral as well as enemy ships attempting to slip through the blockade. Napoleon retaliated by seizing foreign ships arriving in areas he controlled which had touched on a British port. Despite the depredations on neutral American commerce, however, American shipping and prosperity rocketed, for the belligerents needed American foodstuffs and materials, and most United States merchant ships managed to escape the nets set by each belligerent to harm the other.

In their violations of neutral maritime rights, both Britain and France gave cause for war, but in the end the United States went to war against Britain (1812-1814), and not against France. Why? The British had the greater naval power and made more American seizures at sea. They also wounded American pride by searching United States ships and impressing American seamen they claimed had deserted from British ships. Then too, President James Madison and the party in power were Jeffersonian Republicans, friendlier to France than to Britain. Again, in Canada the English had revived their scheme of creating an Indian buffer state south of the Great Lakes and were backing the formidable Indian chief Tecumseh to this end. Tecumseh, in turn, was urging the Creek Indians in the Alabama area to join his confederacy. A war with Britain would justify a war against the hostile Indians, an invasion of Canada, and an invasion of Span-

ish West Florida, where the Creeks were strong.

War with Britain came in June, 1812, at the very time Napoleon began his invasion of Russia. The commercial interests of the northeast United States, speaking through the Federalist party, bitterly opposed the war. They argued in effect that the prewar embargo and the non-intercourse acts imposed by the United States government against the belligerents, in the name of vindicating American maritime rights, gravely injured lucrative neutral trade. They felt that the war not only destroyed that trade but all foreign commerce, because the British blockade bottled up all American ships in American ports. Also, Americans were plunged into the European struggle for power on the wrong side, and became the allies of Napoleon, who had upset the balance of power. As they saw it, the United States had knifed England in the back at a time when only the British fleet stood between Napoleon and world domination.

In the United States, the War of 1812 resulted in the American failure to annex Canada or any part of it, the end of English and Spanish influence among the Indians in the territory between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, and the permanent occupation by the Americans of Spanish West Florida. The peace treaty (Ghent, 1814) said nothing about neutral maritime rights. In Europe, Napoleon met defeat in Russia. Thereafter, the peoples of the countries he had subjected rose in wars of national liberation and, with the aid of Russia and Great Britain, toppled him from power (1813–1815). Thus ended the long series of Anglo-French wars, fought at intervals from 1689 to 1815, which involved rival mercantilist imperialisms and the European and world balance of power. Great Britain emerged as the leading naval, commercial and colonial power of the world, but she never sought to dominate Europe. At last, because of the balance of historical forces in Europe, the Americans were free to give their full attention to developing their vast domain in North America.

AMERICAN CONTINENTALISM, 1815–1898

After 1815, with Great Britain in the lead, the countries of West Europe concentrated on their industrial revolutions at home, learning to apply steam-driven machinery to factories, mines and transport. As a companion to their rising industrialism, the British evolved a free-trade or Manchester theory of economics, which held that wealth and capital accumulated faster when the economy was free of government regulation and was allowed to follow the "natural" laws of competition. According to this theory, the nation that developed large-scale mass production would not need colonies; in a free market, it would sell more manufactured goods than its competitors; it would buy more raw materials from the non-industrialized countries, and have more risk capital to use in such countries. The old mercantile theory, based on an imperial monopoly of commerce in a nation's colonies, became less important; there was less urge to win new colonies. It was not until around 1875 that an industrial and financial imperialism would emerge and a new scramble for colonies would begin. The period after 1815 was one of relative non-imperialism, less international political rivalry, fewer wars, and no global ones.

In 1823, at the behest of the other Holy Alliance powers—the autocracies of Russia, Austria and Prussia—Bourbon France invaded Spain and restored Ferdinand VII as an absolute monarch. After some hesitation, France decided against intervening in Latin America to restore Spanish authority in the recently proclaimed independent republics there. The British wanted to trade with the new Latin American nations but did not want them to become her colonies or the colonies of any other power. Thus Great Britain had sought a joint Anglo-American declaration against any intervention in Latin America. The United States, however, took the occasion to proclaim the Monroe Doctrine¹ (1823), an enunciation of fundamental United States policy on the fiat of the United States alone and not in concert with any European or Latin American state.

Certain basic elements of United States

¹ See also *Current History*, June, 1969, p. 322.

foreign policy were left unclear. While the United States would not interfere with existing European colonies in the Western Hemisphere, it would welcome the liquidation of such colonies. While no European power might expand territorially at the expense of countries in the Americas, the American countries themselves, including the United States, might so expand, for the Monroe Doctrine was certainly not a self-denying ordinance on the part of the United States. While the United States was not interested in the political affairs of Europe, it was still interested in increasing its trade with any and all countries. It was fortunate that the fledgling republic's brash pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine came precisely when the European powers were entering a period of relative non-colonialism.

During this period, the United States was indeed expanding. In 1836, American settlers operating as fifth columnists wrested Texas from Mexico, and in 1845, the United States annexed Texas without Mexico's consent. As a result of the Mexican War (1846–1848), the United States annexed California and New Mexico, which included most of the present states of Utah, Nevada and Arizona, and a slice of Colorado. President John Tyler, President James K. Polk, and other statesmen who directed this expansion raised the specter of British and French penetration; in almost every case they claimed that United States annexation was necessary to forestall a British or French take-over. At the time of these annexations, it was also feared in the United States that Great Britain and France would demand territorial "compensations" in the New World. But this was the period of relative imperialist quiescence in Europe, and neither Great Britain nor France offered any real resistance to the gigantic expansion of the United States to the Pacific, or demanded compensation. (Even in Oregon, all that Great Britain could do in 1846 was to hold part of an area to which she had a long-established claim.) What Great Britain really wanted in the United States she already had—an outlet for her investment capital in an underdeveloped country, and expanding

markets for her increasing industrial output. At this time, United States canals, railroads and other large enterprises usually had substantial amounts of British capital behind them. In 1846, Great Britain repealed her Corn Law tariffs, providing more British markets for United States agricultural produce; that same year the United States adopted the Walker low-rate tariff, providing freer access to United States markets for British goods. In terms of the ethos of this period, had Great Britain wanted a quid pro quo for the sensational territorial expansion of the United States, she would have wanted nothing better than the Walker tariff. The shibboleth of the era was free trade, not colonies.

The Civil War (1861–1865) threatened to divide the United States permanently, to nullify the Monroe Doctrine and reopen North America to European colonialism. Leaders of the Confederacy declared that "Cotton is King" and hoped that the need for raw cotton for textile manufacture in Great Britain and France would lead to British and French recognition of the Confederacy and their active intervention in the South's behalf. Had Great Britain recognized the Confederacy, Napoleon III of France would have followed. But Great Britain held back for a number of reasons. Despite early Confederate victories, the English were never convinced that the Confederacy would make good its independence. The British felt that it was to their long-range advantage to recognize the Union's blockade of the South and thus strengthen the law of naval blockade. In addition, for a variety of reasons, the cotton famine was not so critical as had been anticipated; poor harvests in Europe convinced many Englishmen that they needed Northern cereals more than they needed Southern cotton. The English middle classes and wage-workers sympathized with the Union because of its democratic institutions and anti-slavery position. Last but not least, this was still the period of relative non-imperialism on the part of European powers. France's penetration of Mexico during the Civil War to place the French puppet, the Archduke Maximilian, on the

Mexican throne was largely the personal policy of that august dreamer, Napoleon III. However, it was an indication that if the United States were permanently divided, the European powers would probably have exploited the rivalry of the Union and the Confederacy to make North and South America the scene of another scramble for colonies and dependencies, once the new imperialism got under way following 1875.

During the post-Civil War decades (1865-1898), the United States was little involved in European and world affairs. The Far West was developing; the country was being linked by transcontinental railroads; a gigantic industrial revolution was under way; the nation was concentrating on its internal market behind high tariff barriers; and while European risk capital continued to invest heavily in this development, American investors were supplying more and more of the nation's capital. But the way was being prepared for a larger American involvement. Even before the Spanish-American War (1898), there was an incipient United States imperialism emerging in the Pacific, and from 1880 to 1900 the United States moved from twelfth to third place among the world's naval powers.

ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT-DAY INVOLVEMENT, 1898-1917

After 1875, a new imperialism grew steadily. Industrialism in Europe was reaching maturity, and as goods and capital accumulated, the industrialists, bankers and investors of the advanced countries were meeting growing competition for markets, raw materials and investment opportunities in the "backward" countries. The result was an increasingly feverish race for national monopolies by way of new colonies, protectorates, dependencies and spheres of influence in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. International tensions mounted; a dangerous arms competition developed; and the great European powers ranged themselves into two opposing alliances. The century without a world war (1815-1914) was drawing to a close; a great global war was in the making; and the United

States would not be able to escape this any more than it had been able to escape the impact of the mercantilist imperialisms and world wars prior to 1815.

In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain to liberate Cuba, but finally engaged in a guerrilla war to subjugate the Philippines, which until then had been a Spanish possession. The bulk of world opinion regarded the war with Spain as "aggressive," but Great Britain, fearing the rising naval power of Germany, maintained a benevolent neutrality toward the United States. United States retention of the Philippine Islands was preferable to the risk of their seizure by Germany. During the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), British-American cordiality ripened into a virtual entente because of common fear of Germany, which had been belatedly united as a nation and was viewed as a country aggressively attempting to catch up with the older powers.

The growing Anglo-American cooperation manifested itself in Great Britain's relinquishment in 1901 of her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850; this action gave the United States exclusive control in the construction of the Panama Canal. For its part, the United States took over the policing of Caribbean waters, thus allowing Great Britain to concentrate more of her naval strength against Germany in the North Sea. In 1906, the United States officially participated in the Algeciras Conference, called to ease the dispute between France and Germany over Morocco. United States delegates helped engineer the compromise which in effect gave France (and Great Britain) the victory, but allowed Germany to save face. United States participation at Algeciras was criticized at home as the first example of United States "meddling" in purely European affairs, but President Theodore Roosevelt insisted that the country had a duty to use its influence to prevent a European and world war.

When World War I started in 1914, Americans took it for granted that their country would remain neutral, although their sympathies lay with Great Britain and France. President Woodrow Wilson himself main-

tained a "neutrality" less favorable to Germany than to the Allies. Great Britain and France obtained huge amounts of arms and munitions from American firms, financed by Americans who purchased British and French war bonds floated by New York banks. This did not violate international law, but it gave many influential Americans a personal stake in an Allied victory. The whole United States economy soon boomed as a result of the vast war trade with the Allies.

Great Britain maintained a naval blockade which in some ways differed markedly from past blockades. British naval vessels were stationed not only along the German coasts but also along the mid-ocean sea lanes, where neutral merchant vessels were often intercepted and were frequently sent to British ports for more intensive examination of their cargoes. Virtually the whole North Sea was declared a British military area and the British navy greatly widened the contraband list. The trade of neutral countries near Germany was kept to a peace-time level on the theory that anything above that was destined for Germany; and neutral mail was rifled for information about contraband transactions. President Wilson vigorously protested these violations of neutral rights, but a dangerous American-British crisis was never allowed to develop.

On the other hand, since the Germans conducted naval operations in an even more unprecedented manner and since their depredations destroyed not only property but lives, Wilson held them to a stricter accountability. The Germans set up a submarine blockade of the British Isles and torpedoed—without warning—enemy merchant ships carrying neutral passengers. Sometimes they torpedoed neutral merchant ships and ships carrying no contraband. International law had long held that a belligerent naval vessel could not destroy an enemy merchantman without first stopping it, ascertaining its identity and cargo, and making adequate provision for the safety of passengers and crew. But the Germans contended that British merchantmen were armed; that a submarine, unlike other naval craft, was fragile and that if it surfaced

to give warning it would be sent to the bottom by a single shot or even by the well aimed prow of a merchantman. Wilson, however, maintained that even if the German arguments were valid, the existing rules of international law could not be changed unilaterally in the midst of war.

Late in January, 1917, Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare and declared that any merchant or passenger ship, neutral or belligerent, unarmed or armed, would be sunk without warning if it entered the waters surrounding the British Isles. The Germans knew that this would bring the United States into the war, but they reasoned that the British would starve before the United States could raise an effective fighting force. Germany's intensified submarine campaign did indeed lead to war (April, 1917).

Meantime, the country was psychologically prepared for war by news that Germany was seeking to make an ally of Mexico and was urging her to retake the territory she had lost in the Mexican War. The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, also affected Americans. It was felt that the overthrow of the Czar meant that all of the Allies would be fighting for democracy. There were also some Americans who believed that the Russian Revolution would weaken Russian participation in the war, and that United States participation was thus more necessary than ever to assure the defeat of Germany.

From the beginning of the war, there were informed Americans who held that the real stake was the balance of power, that if Germany upset the existing balance, Americans would live in a more uncomfortable and dangerous world, even if a victorious Germany refrained from attacking the Western Hemisphere. They also believed that the

(Continued on page 52)

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After World War I, "the United States was forced to choose between active support of collective security to prevent war or insulation from conflict. The latter course was chosen."

The Interwar Years

BY ELDEN E. BILLINGS

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WHEN WORLD WAR I ended in 1918, the United States ranked first in army power and second in naval power among the world's nations. President Woodrow Wilson was regarded as the greatest leader of the democratic world. Yet his attendance at the peace conference aroused controversy, and several obstacles stood in the way of his program. One was the secret treaties the Allies had made among themselves before the United States entered the conflict. Another was the vindictive spirit prevalent among the peoples of the Allied countries. A third obstacle was the repudiation of the Wilson administration in the United States congressional elections of 1918. Wilson's choice of delegates was another reason for his final failure; he had not chosen any prominent Republican as a delegate.

Wilson had achieved a significant victory when the Covenant of the League of Nations was included in the Treaty of Versailles. He succeeded in establishing the former German colonies as mandates of the League rather than as possessions of the great powers, although one author has stated that such policies "generally turned out to be thinly disguised imperialism."¹ However, Julius W. Pratt disagreed:

That the system was something more than the

old imperialism camouflaged is shown by the progress toward and final attainment of independence by Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.²

Party politics plus Wilson's refusal to compromise led to Senate refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations deprived Americans of any responsibility for the Middle East. American companies seeking concessions operated in that area; the principle of the open door was followed but no comprehensive national policy was established.

DISARMAMENT CONFERENCES

As a substitute for United States membership in the League of Nations, President Warren Harding called the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921 and 1922. The American delegation determined that naval limitation should receive first priority, that ratios, based upon existing battleships and battle cruisers (built or under construction), should be established among the United States, Great Britain and Japan. A ratio of 5:5:3 was determined for these nations; France and Italy received 1.7 each. An immediate halt in construction and a ten-year naval holiday were declared. Submarines were not outlawed. Cruisers were limited to 10,000 tons; cruisers and aircraft carriers to eight-inch guns. As part of the negotiations (there were three treaties), Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States agreed to respect the status quo in the Pacific.

¹ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 605.

² Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 289.

Although three treaties were signed, they contained no provisions for sanctions against a breach of faith. Their total effect was to give Japan a preponderant position in the Pacific, but the conference did relax international tensions for a decade.³

In 1925, a number of European powers signed treaties (at Locarno, Switzerland) guaranteeing peace along Germany's western borders. The attitude of the United States government toward this action seemed to strengthen its isolation from Europe.

As a sequel to the Washington Conference, President Calvin Coolidge called the other four naval powers to meet in Geneva in 1927 to negotiate further disarmament, a meeting conspicuous for its failure.

In 1930, another conference met in London. The dispute over cruisers was settled rapidly. Great Britain, the United States and Japan received a 10:10:7 ratio in ships. Replacement of capital ships, which was to have begun in 1931, was deferred until 1936, thus saving millions of dollars for all participants. France and Italy attended the conference, but accepted only part of the treaty.

In 1929, the United States, in conjunction with 15 nations (including all the great powers except Russia) had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war as "an instrument of national policy," and sought to solve disputes by peaceful means. The Senate ratified the pact with the reservations that the treaty did not impair the right of self-defense; interfere with the Monroe Doctrine; commit the nation to the use of force; or alter its position under other treaties. Eventually the pact was ratified by nearly all the nations of the world, including Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union.

Immediately, the Senate turned to the next order of business—the appropriation of \$270,000,000 for fifteen 10,000-ton cruisers—legis-

lation approved by President Coolidge one month later.

WAR DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

One of the consequences of World War I which was not realized at the time was the sudden shift of the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation.

The United States government's attitude toward war debts incurred by the Allies had been determined by President Wilson when he flatly refused to consider cancelling Allied obligations. On the other hand the European nations contended that war debt payments depended on the collection of reparations from Germany. The United States continued to believe that payment should be made regardless of reparations.

Germany was not able to meet reparation payments; by December, 1922, she was in default. As a penalty for nonpayment of reparations, the French and Belgians occupied the Ruhr from January, 1923, to September, 1924, while the British deducted 26 per cent from payments for German imports, applying that amount to reparations payments. Germany suffered a disastrous inflation, the value of the mark declining by 99.9 per cent.

In 1930, for the first time, official recognition was given to the relationship between war debts and reparations, through a concurrent agreement (not participated in by the United States) that any scaling down of the debts would bring a concomitant reduction in reparations. Machinery for transfers of reparations was established with the formation of the Bank for International Settlements.

In June, 1931, President Herbert Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium on war debts and reparations. When Germany appealed for more substantial relief, she and her creditors (minus the United States) met at Lausanne in June and July, 1932. An agreement was reached reducing Germany's reparation debt to \$715 million to be paid in government bonds to be deposited in the Bank for International Settlements, and to be sold when the economic position of Germany warranted. They were never sold. Before the meeting, the Germans had refused to pay further rep-

³ Later, United States naval experts claimed that these treaties weakened the American naval position in the Pacific and may have contributed to World War II. Proponents argued that United States naval supremacy could have been maintained only by an expensive building program which Congress was unwilling to vote; and pointed out that, later, under more difficult circumstances, Congress failed to approve appropriations for fortifications in that area.

arations. The European debtors concluded that the United States should scale down the war debts by a commensurate amount, a demand which aroused resentment in the United States. Almost no debt payments were made after December, 1932. After the passage of the Johnson Debt Default Act in April, 1934, even token payments ceased.

LONDON ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

When Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency in March, 1933, internationalists' hopes for world cooperation were heightened. In June, 1933, a multipower economic conference met in London to discuss problems of war debts, trade barriers and currency stabilization. Roosevelt opposed sweeping concessions on the tariff and ruled out any discussion of war debts. The meeting was turned into a fiasco when, on July 2, Roosevelt sent a message repudiating currency stabilization. Roosevelt's action "did nothing to cushion the depression, dealt a heavy blow at international cooperation and accelerated the worldwide drift toward isolationism, big-navyism and extreme nationalism."⁴ Thus vanished the "last opportunity of democratic statesmen to work out a cooperative solution to common economic problems, and it ended in total failure."⁵

A general disarmament conference, in which the United States took part, was sitting in Geneva. The French would not lift restrictions on Germany unless they were assured of support against her by the other great powers. The Hoover administration had refused to offer such assurance; Roosevelt refused also. In October, 1933, when Adolph Hitler took Germany out of the disarmament conference and the League of Nations, Europe's reaction was feeble; the United States was noncommittal. Although the conference limped along until the spring of 1934, its effectiveness was killed.

Roosevelt granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union with the expectation that

extensive foreign trade might result, that Russia might serve as a buffer against Japanese and German expansion and that Soviet propaganda in the United States might be curbed. None of the expectations materialized. The question of war debts was left for future settlement.

NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION

In March, 1935, Hitler ordered the resumption of compulsory military training in Germany and increased Germany's army to 500,000, contrary to the Versailles Treaty and to Germany's treaty with the United States. Great Britain condoned Hitler's action, and consented to the building of a German navy 35 per cent the size of Britain's—far beyond the treaty limit.

During this period, the United States was forced to choose between active support of collective security to prevent war or insulation from conflict. The latter course was chosen.

As Hitler and Italian Premier Benito Mussolini became more openly aggressive, Roosevelt asked Congress for authority to refuse to ship arms and munitions to aggressor nations. Instead, on August 31, 1935, Congress passed the first of a series of Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of a European war. The Neutrality Act of 1935 provided that whenever the President proclaimed the existence of a war, the sale or transportation of armaments to all belligerents was prohibited. The Neutrality Act of 1936 broadened the provisions of the 1935 law.

The weakness of the neutrality legislation was made clear in the years that followed. When Italy attacked Ethiopia late in 1935, the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions on Italy, declaring her the aggressor. But oil, iron, steel, coal and coke were not on the list of banned items. Nor did the United States embargo the export of oil to Italy; the President had no authority to forbid its export.

Ethiopia was conquered by May, 1936. In April of that year, Hitler had occupied the Rhineland.

In July, 1936, a group of Spanish generals rebelled against the Spanish government, starting a civil war which dragged on until

⁴ Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 668-9.

⁵ William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 203.

1939. Roosevelt treated this war as if it were a conflict between two foreign states with equal rights. He accepted the British and French view that strict nonintervention was the only way to prevent a broader conflict. Undoubtedly, this policy helped sustain British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's disastrous appeasement policy which permitted Germany and Italy to support General Francisco Franco while the democracies did nothing to help the Loyalists. Under the terms of the Neutrality Act of 1936, the Roosevelt administration maintained sanctions until the Spanish Loyalists were defeated.

In October, 1936, Hitler and Mussolini formed the Rome-Berlin Axis and one month later Germany and Japan established the Anti-Comintern Pact against the Soviet Union. Italy joined this Pact the following year.

NEUTRALITY REVISION

In 1937, a new neutrality act became law. It extended indefinitely the main provisions of previous acts and added a new section (to expire May 1, 1939) which empowered the President in the event of war to prohibit the export of articles other than arms and munitions unless the buyer paid cash and took the goods away in his own vessels. This legislation served notice to both totalitarian aggressors and to democratic nations that in case of attack, the democracies could expect no United States aid. Thus the Congress, intent upon keeping the United States out of war, passed legislation which made war more probable.

Hitler moved again in the spring of 1938, occupying Austria. Britain and France protested, but no one raised a hand to help Austria. In the summer, Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia give the Sudetenland, German-speaking Czechoslovakia, to Germany. A European crisis loomed. Though France and Great Britain were bound by alliances to aid Czechoslovakia in war against Germany, they chose appeasement. British Prime Minister Chamberlain paid two visits to Hitler to discuss terms. President Roosevelt kept the wires hot with appeals. He persuaded Musso-

lini to induce Hitler to agree to hold talks.

As a result, conferences were held at Munich, September 29-30, at which Great Britain and France signed an agreement giving the Nazis a nearly free hand in the Sudetenland. The Western democracies lost the 40 Czech divisions, the great arsenal of Czech munitions plants and most of their moral prestige in East Europe. Nothing in the records indicates that the United States government disapproved the Munich settlement; it sought peace with honor, if possible, but above all, peace.

Hitler annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939; Mussolini invaded Albania on April 7. Roosevelt dispatched messages to Hitler and Mussolini on April 14, appealing to them to pledge that for at least 10 years they would not attack any of the 31 nations of Europe and the Near East. Both dictators responded with scorn. During the summer, Roosevelt sought revision of the Neutrality Act, but failed.

Hitler began making demands against Poland for the Polish Corridor and Danzig. When Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact August 23, Hitler had a green light for the invasion of Poland. On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, Great Britain and France declared war. President Roosevelt issued a routine proclamation of neutrality on September 5. Poland was partitioned by Germany and the Soviet Union after the capture of Warsaw on September 28.

Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, wary of Hitler, invaded Finland in November. Roosevelt denounced the Russians and called for a moral embargo on the shipment of planes and war materials to Russia. Sympathy for Finland was great; she was granted a moratorium on her debt payment and a loan of \$30 million to purchase nonmilitary items, but no further help was possible under existing legislation. Finland fell to Soviet troops in March, 1940.

Congress was called into special session in September, 1940, to revise the neutrality law. Roosevelt recommended repeal of the arms embargo, the reenactment of the expired cash-and-carry safeguard, and restrictions

on United States ships and citizens sailing into danger zones. In November, a compromise act was passed. The arms embargo was lifted and American ships were forbidden to enter the danger zones. Allied purchasers of war materials would be required to deal with the United States on a cash-and-carry basis.

1940: PREPARATION FOR CONFLICT

During the first half of 1940, the Nazis conquered Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The British army escaped at Dunkirk, but lost much equipment. From August to October the German *Luftwaffe* launched a tremendous air bombardment against the British Isles, but the Royal Air Force beat off the attack. So heavy were German plane losses that Hitler abandoned the air assault and gave up plans to invade Britain the following year. On October 8, Germany invaded and conquered Rumania.

During the summer, Congress took important steps toward strengthening military forces and stepping up production of war materials. The army was to be increased from 280,000 to 1,200,000. Army and Navy planes were to be augmented by over 18,000; production was to be increased to 50,000 planes per year. 1,325,000 tons of ship construction were authorized. In September, the first peacetime conscription law in United States history was passed. One month later, 16,400,000 men were enrolled.

Although 1940 was an election year, steps were taken to prepare for any eventuality. In May, a National Advisory Defense Commission was organized to coordinate all economic activity. On June 3, the War Department began to provide outdated arms and aircraft to Great Britain. A National Defense Research Committee was formed on June 15. Five days later, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, prominent Republicans, were named Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, respectively. On December 20, the Office of Production Management was established to

⁶ Julius W. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 393. For further information on this period, see Arthur Turner, "The U.S. in World War II," pp. 13 ff. of this issue.

coordinate the nation's defense production.

In September, 1940, Roosevelt had given Great Britain 50 over-age destroyers in return for 99-year leases permitting the establishment of United States military bases in eight British possessions in the New World. This action was taken without the approval of Congress and was, in Winston Churchill's words, "a decidedly unneutral act." Congress ultimately registered its approval by voting funds to recondition the destroyers. With this, the United States abandoned any pretext of neutrality. Even isolationists approved because Western Hemisphere defense was being strengthened. Germany responded by signing the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Japan on September 27, 1940.

In a radio address on December 27, Roosevelt pictured the United States as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and in his message to Congress a few days later he officially proposed legislation that became the Lend Lease Act of March 11, 1941. The act pledged the United States to lend "defense articles" to those nations whose defense the President thought vital to our defense. The equipment was eventually to be returned or replaced.

1941: FINAL STEPS

From January to March, 1941, British and United States military and naval officers held secret conferences in Washington to plan the coordination of joint efforts: "(a) on the basis of lend-lease, while the United States remained non-belligerent; (b) in joint military and naval operations if and when the United States entered the war."⁶ The conclusion was reached that Germany should be regarded as the main enemy.

To help the British navy, United States air and naval bases were established on Greenland and Iceland, and navy patrols were au-

(Continued on page 53)

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"The pragmatic decision of the Arcadia conference . . . constituted the essential United States 'commitment' to Europe in the Second World War. . . . The United States signed no formal alliance. But the United States commitment was much more complete than in the First [World] War, the period of United States participation was much longer . . . and in substance there was . . . a 'Grand Alliance' of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. . . ."

The U. S. in World War II

BY ARTHUR C. TURNER

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IN THE PROCESS of the transition from a United States tradition of non-involvement to a policy of active participation and continuous involvement in world affairs, the period of World War II is the crucial turning point. This was not the beginning of United States intervention overseas. The United States had been an "Associated Power" on the British and French side in the last 18 months of World War I, and its participation had tipped the scales decisively toward victory. That intervention had been short-lived, however, a parenthesis in policy rather than a long-term change of course. It was World War II that inaugurated a striking departure from American tradition in the shape of continuous involvement overseas and, above all, in Europe.

The extent of the change that has taken place is reflected in the curious mirror-image relationship between certain American attitudes of the 1930's and certain European attitudes of today.

In the middle 1930's, United States policy consisted almost wholly of a determined isolationism. National policy, which reflected public sentiment accurately, held that the proper course for the United States was to be rigidly neutral in the disputes of Europe. Europe was where the wars started. If they started again, Great Britain would no doubt be involved; and Great Britain, whose power

to influence United States policy was regarded with deep suspicion, would try to drag the United States in, as she had succeeded in doing before. To avoid the error of 1917 it was necessary to avoid all talk of right and wrong and all attitudes and policies that would aid one European belligerent or disadvantage another. The United States, it was felt, must show its superior wisdom, even its superior morality, by refraining from participation in Old World disputes.

Compare this with certain attitudes common in Europe today which do not, perhaps, represent popular sentiment in West Europe, but which are the current coin of the European *intelligentsia*. According to this widely-voiced world view, European countries can best demonstrate their superior wisdom and, indeed, superior morality by refraining from participation in Asian struggles. Asia is where the wars begin, and the United States shows a chronic, bull-in-the-china-shop penchant for getting involved in such wars. Rights and wrongs are hardly worth discussing, though it may safely be assumed that whatever the United States is doing is wrong.

As a corollary, the European proponents of such a view hold that United States involvement in Europe—including NATO, the stationing of troops in Europe, American investment in and control of European industry, and the American cultural impact on Europe

—is, in all its aspects, deplorable. (In the 1930's, Europeans had hoped for an American commitment to Europe.)

That such a total, almost comic, trans-Atlantic transference of attitudes and reversal of roles is possible is testimony to the basic change that has occurred in the past 30 years in United States policy, and in the world in which that policy is exercised.

The isolationist policies of the United States were enshrined in the three Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937. If faithfully adhered to, these would in all probability have sufficed to keep the United States out of the war which broke out in Europe in 1939. They would also have made German victory in that war virtually certain. The chief contribution that the United States made to the developing crisis in the summer of 1939 was the encouragement of Germany through the expiration in May of the "cash and carry" provisions of the 1937 act.

The war of 1939–1945 in Europe may be divided, as far as the United States is concerned, into three periods of increasing duration and intensifying involvement. The first lasted from the German and subsequent Russian attack on Poland in September, 1939, until the German conquest of France in June, 1940. The second phase lasted from the summer of 1940 until Pearl Harbor; and the third from Pearl Harbor until the complete defeat of Germany in May, 1945. In the third phase, the United States replaced Britain as the predominant partner among the Allies.

BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

Until December, 1941, the United States increasingly turned from isolationism and, indeed, from neutrality. After the defeat of France in June, 1940, neutrality was replaced by "non-belligerency," to give Great Britain all possible aid short of actually going to war with Germany. President Franklin Roosevelt knew that he could not actually involve the country in war without a more substantial reason than any that had yet appeared, but he was energetic and ingenious in exploring the limits of possible action.

Many of these steps were of a naval char-

acter, taken by the President in virtue of his office as Commander-in-Chief, and intended above all to avert British defeat in what Prime Minister Winston Churchill dubbed "the Battle of the Atlantic." Thus, in March, 1941, the President authorized United States naval yards to repair British ships. The same month he transferred 10 Coastguard cutters to Britain to assist in antisubmarine warfare, and seized interned Axis and Danish ships in American ports.

From the spring of 1941 onward the United States Navy had orders to patrol the Atlantic as far east as the 25th meridian, and to radio to the Royal Navy the whereabouts of any German vessels encountered. Greenland was taken under American control in April, 1941, and in June the United States took over the garrisoning of Iceland, occupied the previous year by Britain. Both of these places were possessions of German-occupied Denmark.

In May, 1941, United States ships were moved from the Pacific fleet to escort United States merchantmen on their way to England. The *Robin Moor*, an American freighter, was torpedoed on May 21 by a German submarine. On May 27, the President proclaimed a national emergency, and said, "Our patrols are helping now to ensure delivery of the needed supplies to Britain." Further steps were the freezing on June 14 of German and Italian assets in the United States and the compulsory closing of all consulates and offices of the two countries.

After the attack on the U.S.S. *Greer* in Icelandic waters on September 4, 1941, United States protection was extended to all merchant ships in the United States patrol zone; and all German and Italian ships of war in the zone were to be fired on when sighted. On October 17, the destroyer *Kearny* was torpedoed off Iceland but reached port. Another destroyer, the *Reuben James*, was torpedoed and sunk on October 31. Thus, in the months before Pearl Harbor, there was a steadily increasing United States commitment to the naval war in support of Great Britain, an undeclared war which had already led to American casualties. As Robert E. Sherwood pointed out in his admirable book on Harry

Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal envoy to Churchill, in 1941 there was already the greatest possible contrast between the United States Atlantic Fleet, operating under battle conditions, and the Pacific Fleet, easygoing, all too successfully "trying to act and even to think in terms of peacetime routine."¹

Concurrent with the unfolding of naval warfare in which the United States Navy assisted Britain in keeping the sea-lanes open, there had occurred the initiation of a vast program to assist Britain (then beginning to be in desperate financial straits) and other allies. The idea of Lend-Lease had been propounded by President Roosevelt on December 17, 1940, and it became law on March 11, 1941. The two facets of Roosevelt's policy were complementary: there was no use in allowing Britain to buy supplies in the United States if the supplies never reached the embattled island; it was equally pointless to keep the sea-lanes open if the British capacity to pay were to be exhausted and no other arrangements were made.

The Lend-Lease Act had given the President broad discretionary powers to authorize—when he deemed it in the interest of national defense, and to the extent to which funds were available—the production or procurement of any defense article for the use of any country whose defense was vital to the defense of the United States. The terms and conditions were merely to be such as the President deemed satisfactory. This new measure did not end Great Britain's dollar problem, but it made it bearable. It was a guarantee that she would not fail because she lacked dollars.

A more striking though in fact less substantial sign of growing Anglo-American co-operation was the meeting at sea—in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland—of Roosevelt and Churchill in August, 1941, the first of nine meetings during the war. The British hoped on this occasion for solid undertakings of United States military assistance. They did not get them. Roosevelt's chief anxiety at this point was to facilitate aid to Soviet Rus-

sia, which had been invaded by Germany on June 22 and was generally (but quite wrongly) thought to be on the edge of defeat. Few people followed the then Senator Harry S. Truman in his argument that Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany should be left to cut each other's throats.

The curious outcome of the Placentia meeting was the "Atlantic Charter," a highfalutin declaration in eight clauses about the kind of world that the President and the Prime Minister hoped to see after the war, issued August 14. It was not any sort of treaty; it had, indeed, no constitutional standing whatever, and the relation between it and any actual policies followed at the end of the war is tenuous indeed. In form it was merely a press release. Yet it indicated that the United States was deeply concerned with the shape of the postwar world, and was presumably committed to active participation in determining what it would be. This was an enormous change from the situation even two years previously.

PRIORITY FOR EUROPE

While congressional debates on Lend-Lease were proceeding, certain Anglo-American military conversations were taking place in Washington. While these were examples of pure contingency planning, and did not involve any commitment, they did look forward to possible participation by the United States in the war on the British side. In fact, they were more important, for they actually determined the whole shape and course of the war.

The joint British-American staff talks were held between January 29 and March 27, 1941. The objective was to consider what strategy ought to be "should the United States be compelled to resort to war." The ABC-1 agreement, as it was called, concluded that even if Japan entered the war, priority should be given to defeating Germany: "since Germany is the predominant partner of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean area is considered to be the decisive theater."

When Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the whole strength of the United States was committed

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950).

to victory. The war against the Axis became a war of three allies with two far more powerful than the third—Great Britain. The British had, however, made a unique contribution, and once Britain's lonely and heroic stand was successful, victory in the long run was reasonably certain.

On December 13, 1941, Churchill and his advisers left for the United States and the series of conferences in December and January, 1942, known as "Arcadia." There was some reason for the British to fear that, since war had actually come to the United States in the Pacific, the main strength of the United States would be directed against Japan. It would, indeed, have been awkward if Germany had refrained from declaring war on the United States, toward which Adolph Hitler's policy had been cautious and forebearing throughout 1941. Fortunately, however, Hitler demonstrated his loyalty to Japan by declaring war on the United States, and the Japanese cemented the alliance in the Pacific by impartially attacking both British and American territories.

In the event, though some presidential advisers wished otherwise, the Arcadia conference upheld the ABC-1 doctrine of "Europe first." There seems to be remarkably little evidence of the reasons for this supremely important decision. In part (like many government decisions) it continued along a road already taken. The burning problem for a long time had been a Germany actually at war; Japan had been merely a potential threat. Further, until Japan could be contained by naval forces in the Pacific, Europe and the Mediterranean offered the only possibility of deploying American land armies.

There were also, undoubtedly, deeper motives. Whatever suspicions might be entertained of "British imperialism," there was a feeling of kinship toward Britain that had no parallel. More broadly, there was a feeling of cultural affinity with Europe—the home continent of the United States—that made it a matter of greater urgency to rescue the European nations suffering under German occupation than to ensure United States security in the Pacific theater.

The pragmatic decision of the Arcadia conference, confirming the earlier ABC-1 contingency plans, constituted the essential United States "commitment" to Europe in World War II. Nor, in the following years, despite dissident opinion in Washington, despite occasional alarms on Winston Churchill's part, was there much danger of Roosevelt's reneging on the determination of priority for Europe. The history of the remainder of the war, in truth, concerns the execution, rather than the making, of the commitment.

As in World War I, the United States signed no formal alliance. But the United States commitment was much more complete than in the First World War, the period of United States participation was much longer (three and one-half years as against one and one-half) and in substance there was, in Churchill's phrase, a "Grand Alliance" of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, which waged war with the primary and overriding purpose of defeating Germany.

Beyond that there was no *common* political purpose. Looking beyond the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union indeed had purposes; Britain had purposes, or at any rate apprehensions; the United States was averse even to considering the matter. The nearest approach to an alliance or to a statement of common political purpose was the "Declaration of the United Nations," signed by the three great allies and 26 other states on January 1, 1942, in Washington, D.C. This was an executive agreement, and was never submitted to the Senate. It laid the groundwork for the later creation of the actual organization, the United Nations, in 1944 and 1945.

The reality of cooperation centered in the remarkable personal relationship of Roosevelt and Churchill, who met nine times and who exchanged voluminous messages constantly. Harry Hopkins shuttled the Atlantic as a go-between. There was a real, if wary, friendship between the two leaders; Churchill's greater literary ability and persistence in argument was barely able to maintain the pretense of equality between the allies in the face of the overwhelming preponderance of United States power. On major issues, where there

was a difference Churchill habitually backed down.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Anxiety to help the Soviet Union as much as possible led Roosevelt to make a slightly ambiguous undertaking regarding the creation of a Second Front in Europe in 1942. No such second front against Germany was, in fact, possible that year, or even the next year. A second front was, however, established in French North Africa by the joint United States-British landings on November 8, 1942. These brought on a rather tangled imbroglio in United States relations with France. United States sympathy with France went back to the Revolutionary War and was strong. The crux was the question of which authorities should be regarded as standing for France.

The United States, unlike Great Britain, maintained diplomatic relations after the fall of France with Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain's government at Vichy² and, again unlike Britain, did not regard General Charles de Gaulle as, in effect, the head of a French government-in-exile. When the landings in North Africa took place, the commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, made a cease-fire agreement with Admiral François Darlan, head of the Vichy forces, who happened to be in Algeria. This policy of expediency lasted until Darlan's assassination on December 24, 1942. The United States then transferred recognition to General Louis-Dominique Giraud, rebuffing de Gaulle. The wellsprings of many later animosities are to be found in this period. In June, 1943, both Churchill and Roosevelt recognized a reconstructed "French Committee of National Liberation" with Giraud and de Gaulle as co-chairmen. By November, the superior political skill of de Gaulle enabled him to assume full control. The following summer, de Gaulle paid his first visit to Washington. And in October, 1944, after the allies were fighting in France and had captured Paris, the United States and its allies recognized de Gaulle's adminis-

tration as the Provisional Government of France, and France formally resumed her place in the coalition.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

As is now widely recognized, President Roosevelt's world view was not free of illusion. He exaggerated the vitality and ambition of the British Empire, for which he had a deep dislike. He showered Churchill with advice on giving independence to India. On the contrary, he failed to estimate adequately the ambitions of the Soviet Union. By a curious process of overcompensating for a natural cultural affinity with Britain, United States policy-makers habitually gave Soviet Russia the benefit of the doubt, and just as habitually denied it to Britain during the war. Two examples may suffice. Under Lend-Lease, the British had to justify in detail every claim for equipment or munitions; the Russians, however, were given everything for which they asked without scrutiny, up to the limit of supplies and carrying capacity. When arrangements were made in 1944 for the future division of Germany into zones of occupation, the United States authorities were scrupulously careful to obtain from Great Britain explicit rights of access to Bremen, a United States enclave in the British zone. No such explicit undertakings existed with regard to United States, British and French access to Berlin, an enclave in the Russian zone.

In short, the immense military exertions of the United States in Europe were not matched by any profound or instinctive knowledge of its problems, particularly in regard to East European questions. A shallow and myopic optimism about Russian intentions prevailed.

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² The government which negotiated the terms of France's surrender to Germany in June, 1940..

During the Truman era, according to this specialist, United States military policy broke sharply with tradition: "The North Atlantic Treaty was the first treaty of its kind signed by the United States in time of peace."

The Truman Doctrine and NATO

BY LOUIS W. KOENIG
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IN THE FINAL days of Franklin Roosevelt's administration, United States relations with the Soviet Union, a wartime ally, were deteriorating. During World War II, Roosevelt had insisted that the Western Allies confine negotiations with the Russians largely to military affairs; therefore divisive issues were postponed. In effect, Roosevelt maintained a superficial harmony during the war, but he passed a full plate of problems to his successor. The process of worsening relations with the U.S.S.R. continued and deepened following Harry S. Truman's assumption of the presidency.

From the first until the last day of its duration, the Truman administration never enjoyed a period of serenity in its relations with the Soviet Union. When Truman came into office in April, 1945, the United States and the U.S.S.R. were in controversy over the establishment of a government of Poland representative of the people. At the San Francisco Conference of 1945 to organize the United Nations, there was more controversy over the seating of Argentina, the meaning of the veto, and other issues. In early 1946, the U.S.S.R. refused to remove its troops from Iran; the dispute went to the U.N. Security Council, and the first of many vetoes was cast.

Only after bitter protracted negotiations was agreement reached on a peace treaty for Italy and lesser allies of Germany. Profound disagreement within the Allied Control Council led finally to the abandonment of four-power rule of Germany.

In the United Nations, United States proposals for the international control of atomic energy were opposed by the Soviet Union. The Soviets also rejected American proposals for disarmament and for the admission of various new members. In 1950, the Soviet Union opposed U.N. action to halt aggression in Korea.

In quick steps, the Soviet Union built up a ring of satellites—Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland and East Germany. The pattern of aggrandizement was always the same: occupation by Soviet armies, acquisition by the Communists of key posts in the Cabinet, control of the police and armies, dominance of the media of mass communications and subversion of the judiciary. In almost every month of the Truman administration, the Communists were engaged in contests of military strength somewhere in the world—guerrilla warfare in Greece, the great logistic test of the Berlin blockade and full-scale strife in Korea and Indochina.

Against this background of continuously boiling trouble, Truman followed several principles. He did not want the United States ever to show weakness in dealing with the Soviet Union. He put a special premium on blunt candor in his own discussions with Soviet representatives and took care that the U.S.S.R. was accurately apprised of United States intentions. Above all, he valued swift, resolute action in response to Soviet thrusts.

The first of the huge foreign assistance programs of the Truman administration was

focused on Greece and Turkey. It was also the first major application of what soon became known as the policy of "containment."

Affairs in Greece had been in varying states of crisis since the country's liberation in 1944. Civil war raged and inflation soared. The British, whose forces had entered Greece when the Germans moved out, had labored for three years to restore stability and had lent support to the "rightist" government in its civil war with well equipped Communist forces. In February, 1947, the overburdened British shocked the United States by announcing that they no longer could carry their responsibilities in Greece.

The United States feared that the Communist guerrillas, who were believed to be receiving help from their Communist neighbors, would probably seize control of Greece when the British withdrew. Thus Greece would fall within the Soviet orbit. Although Turkey, unlike Greece, had no serious internal difficulties, it was keeping a large army mobilized at great expense because of the threatening proximity of Soviet forces. If Greece passed under Soviet domination, the position of Turkey would become untenable. Then the strategically vital eastern Mediterranean would fall into Communist hands, with enormous consequences for the West.

On March 12, 1947, Truman appeared before Congress to make the epochal announcement of what became known as the "Truman Doctrine."^{*} A primary objective of United States foreign policy, he said, was the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. . . . We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.

He added that the direct or indirect aggression of totalitarian regimes against "free peoples . . . undermines the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Truman requested an appropriation of \$400 million for military

and economic aid for both Greece and Turkey.

In Congress and outside its halls there was much criticism that the President was bypassing the United Nations. The administration answered that the United Nations lacked the means to extend the aid that was required. The veto "of certain members" might block action, and in any case the United Nations would have to turn to the United States for funds and material and technical aid, with much loss of time. Eventually, Congress acquiesced fully to the President's request. A face-saving amendment provided that whenever the United Nations was prepared to take over the burden, the United States would lay it down.

The final legislation provided for aid in the form of loans or grants. United States civilian and military advisers were to assist Greece and Turkey to make effective use of the aid. The President was required to withdraw any or all aid if requested to do so by either the Greek or the Turkish governments. The recipient governments were required to give free access to United States officials and to the American press to see how the aid was being used. In each country, full publicity was to be given to the aid programs.

Although faced with numerous and formidable difficulties, the Truman Doctrine achieved its fundamental aim; it kept Greece and Turkey out of the Soviet orbit. The severity of the Greek civil war necessitated an unforeseen enlargement of the Greek army; it required the transfer of sizeable funds from the economic side of the program to the military. At the request of the Greek government, United States military advisers went into the field to "advise directly." Funds were also used for such military support purposes as improving port facilities, roads and highways; and long-range agricultural and health projects were launched. Toward the end of 1949, hostilities came to an end in Greece and attention shifted to the country's serious economic problems—to inflation and unemployment. Although the United States sought to broaden the "rightist" government, it could not escape the

* Ed Note: For excerpts see p. 49 of this issue.

criticism heard in domestic debate that it was violating its democratic traditions by supporting reactionary government abroad.

United States aid to Turkey, 90 per cent of which was military, succeeded in scaling down Turkish forces to a size more nearly within the capabilities of the Turkish economy. Democracy gained in Turkey to the point that the established People's party, founded by the dictator Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was voted out at the polls in 1950 and was replaced by a new government organized by the opposition.

The Truman Doctrine was of enormous significance. It enabled the United States to undertake a bold initiative in the cold war. Framed in broad terms, it moved from the limited base of Greece and Turkey to the far more ambitious and important Marshall Plan and Atlantic Pact.

THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

The policy of containment was expressed in the Truman Doctrine and in other subsequent statements. It received its most extensive theoretical analysis and exposition not in presidential pronouncements but in the writings of George F. Kennan. Early in 1946, when a reassessment of United States foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was well under way, Kennan, a scholarly career officer of the Foreign Service, was chargé d'affaires in Moscow. On February 22, he dispatched what became a famous and influential cable to the State Department, seeking to explain Soviet behavior and proposing a suitable United States and Western response. The cable was the basis for Kennan's anonymous article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in July, 1947. In the spring of 1947, Kennan was appointed director of the State Department's newly created Policy Planning Staff; thereafter he enjoyed an effective vantage point from which to influence United States policy.

The nature of Soviet power, Kennan observed, was the product of ideology and circumstance. The ideology, which was inherited, held that capitalist production was inefficient, exploitative of the working class,

and bearing the seeds of its own destruction. Soviet leaders, eager to achieve the speedy industrialization of their own country, were insecure. In Soviet society they shared power with no one; they had no tradition of compromise like the tradition of Anglo-American political systems. Even within the party, the center of power, the struggle was continuous to cause

the membership to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breadth of the party leadership and the overbrooding presence of the "word."

As Kennan described the situation, the efforts of Soviet leaders to consolidate their power were directed not only against forces at home, but also against the outside world. Indeed, the stereotype of an outside world bent upon destroying communism was a staple of party doctrine, providing necessity and justification for sacrifice, unity and belligerency. Moscow's fear of foreign hostility was not founded in fact, but sprang from the necessity of explaining the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home. Against such a background, Kennan felt, Moscow could never sincerely accept a community of aims between the Soviet Union and the powers which it regarded as capitalist. In Moscow, the unvarying assumption was that the aims of the capitalist world were antagonistic to the Soviet regime. If the Soviet government came on occasion to agreement with a capitalist government,

this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*.

The Kremlin was under no compulsion to hurry, nor did it have any compunction about retreating in the face of superior force.

Having described the Soviet condition, Kennan offered a specific prescription for dealing with it.

... the Soviet pressure [he wrote] against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy....

In the foreseeable future, the United States must not expect to enjoy political intimacy with the Russians but must bear with them as rivals rather than as partners. The United States must continue to expect that

Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability . . . but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disrupting and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

In practical terms, containment meant the throwing of political, economic and even military roadblocks across the paths of Soviet thrusts. A massive program of economic assistance, known as the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program, had its origins in speeches in May and June, 1947, by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Although United States aid to restore the Western European economies had been generous since the latter stages of World War II, the economies of countries such as Italy, Germany and Austria had been slow to recover from the war. Because of West Europe's economic interdependence, a retarded Germany threatened to nullify the progress made by other nations. In addition, strong local Communist parties were pressing hard in France and Italy in 1947.

The Marshall Plan was a combination of European self-help and massive American expenditures. The Soviet Union was invited to join the effort to aid European recovery, but after some hesitation it declined. In 1948 and 1949, a miraculous transformation occurred in West Europe: war-damaged economies recovered and production levels rose to points exceeding pre-World War II outputs.

But economic assistance from the United States was not enough. In February, 1948, a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia appalled the Western world. Russia seemed to be embarked on a deliberate course of aggres-

sion, taking over the nations of central and West Europe, one by one. One month later at Brussels, five alarmed West European nations—Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—signed a 50-year defense pact, by which they agreed to aid one another should an aggressor attack. The United States, already the economic partner and underwriter of these nations, was drawn into their military alliance. In an address to Congress the day the pact was signed, President Truman expressed confidence that the United States would "by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires."

In June, 1948, the United States Senate, by overwhelming vote, adopted the Vandenberg resolution,¹ framed in close collaboration with the administration. This affirmed United States support for such regional security pacts as that adopted at Brussels. The State Department moved ahead with negotiations to include the United States within the framework set up by the Brussels powers. Eventually, on April 4, 1949, 12 nations signed what became known as the North Atlantic Treaty.² In addition to the United States and the Brussels powers, the signatories included Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy. The treaty committed the United States and its fellow powers to develop by self-help and mutual aid their individual and collective capacity to resist attack; to consult together about any threat to the territorial integrity, independence or security of any of the parties; to consider an attack upon any one of the parties in the North Atlantic area as an attack against them all; to assist the attacked party

by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The North Atlantic Treaty was the first treaty of its kind signed by the United States in time of peace. It abandoned the traditional policy of avoiding entangling alliances. Wide public support for the treaty was indicative of the growing fear of the Soviet

¹ Named for Michigan Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.

² For excerpts from this treaty see p. 50 of this issue.

Union. On the whole, Americans seemed to believe that if another world war broke out the United States would be involved in it from the beginning. Consequently, it was felt, the United States might be able to prevent a war (as it had failed to do in 1914 and 1939) by giving prior notice to potential aggressors that they would have to face the United States.

The progress of the North Atlantic Treaty in the Senate was speeded by the Berlin crisis, precipitated when Russian authorities shut off non-Russian traffic to Berlin, except by air.³ The Soviet Union evidently assumed that the Western powers, unable to supply the population and the military forces in their sectors of the city, would abandon Berlin. The United States and Great Britain faced up to the challenge by commencing the Berlin airlift, by means of which they undertook the prodigious task of supplying their sectors of the beleaguered city.

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Promptly after Senate approval of NATO, President Truman asked Congress for legislation to provide "military aid to free nations," with an expenditure of \$1.45 billion in the fiscal year 1949-1950. The administration contemplated a program of arms aid to the NATO countries as well as to Greece, Turkey and the Philippines.

Our objective [said the President] is to see to it that these nations are equipped, in the shortest possible time, with compact and efficiently trained forces capable of maintaining internal order and resisting the initial phases of external aggression.

Legislative debate was sharp. The powerful Senate Republican leaders, Robert Taft of Ohio and Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, argued that arms aid was unnecessary, that the mere existence of the treaty would deter the Soviet Union. The eventual passage of the aid bill was considerably eased by the President's announcement of an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union.

³ On June 24, 1948.

⁴ For the text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, see *Current History*, December, 1949, pp. 359ff.

In the following months, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created as the international organization to give effect to the treaty. In addition to its participation in NATO, the United States concluded bilateral agreements with the NATO member countries, governing the provision of United States military aid, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Acts.⁴ In addition, the administration took three major steps to make NATO an effective deterrent force. It won acceptance from the NATO nations of the principle of contributions to a united defense force with German participation. Initially, the participating nations planned to maintain only their own forces and make their own defense plans. After much effort, the administration persuaded the Western allies that the NATO power would be strongest if there were a single NATO defense force "to which each country would contribute its share." At best, the principle was accorded limited and grudging acceptance.

In a second major move, the Truman administration induced General Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Europe. The appointment was extremely popular with the NATO nations. A third major move was the commitment of United States troops to Europe as part of the NATO forces. The step touched off an acrimonious Senate debate. Senators Taft and Kenneth Wherry (R., Nebraska) challenged the President's power to send United States troops abroad in peacetime, and a resolution was introduced to prevent the President from taking such action without congressional consent. The administration fought back vigorously and eventually a substitute resolution was passed, permitting four United States divisions to be sent to NATO, but advising the President to ask for the approval of Congress before sending more.

The administration also faced the reluctance of some NATO countries to improve their military strength and to contribute to an integrated NATO force. Some of these countries were anxious to keep the door open for negotiations with the Soviet Union, and

to enter into an armament race seemed to shut it. Outlays for armaments also had domestic repercussions which dimmed the enthusiasm of certain NATO governments. Rearmament meant cutbacks in the standard of living and gave aid and comfort to such critics of NATO as Aneurin Bevan in Great Britain and General Charles de Gaulle in France.

Yet for all its difficulties, NATO made such progress that its Council meeting in Lisbon in February, 1952, dared to plan for a level of some 50 army divisions—half of them on active duty—and some 4,000 aircraft by the end of 1952. A further build-up was planned for 1953 and 1954, supplemented by the forces of Greece and Turkey and the expected inclusion of West Germany in the European Defense Community. Thus, as President Truman described it in a message to Congress on March 6, 1952, the program would "bring within measurable distance the time when even the most foolhardy man in the Kremlin will not dare risk open attack." The President's statement must be read in conjunction with the observation by United States General Matthew Ridgeway, then the NATO Supreme Commander, on October 14, 1952, that

Although our forces today are far stronger than they were two years ago . . . we are still far from the minimum we need to deal with an all-out surprise attack. . . .

In terms of its dominant purpose, NATO was an unqualified success in the Truman era. Although it did not and probably could not achieve the kind of integrated military force capable, in itself, of repelling a determined invasion of Western Europe, it did create the deterrent that prevented an invasion. The solid historical fact is that no boundary in Europe has changed since 1948; the ominous advance of the Iron Curtain was halted.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Truman era was one of rapid United States involvement in the Middle East. As early as 1946, pressures upon Iran by the Soviet Union brought United States support

for prompt action by the United Nations Security Council. Turkey, the beneficiary of the Truman Doctrine beginning in 1947, was brought into the NATO system in 1952. As a leading supporter of the establishment of the new state of Israel, the United States faced continuing and difficult problems in its relations with the conglomerate of hypersensitive, incompatible states of the Middle East. In its initial years, the Truman administration worked to prop up British power in the Middle East, but turned down repeated British invitations to share military responsibilities in Palestine. The United States sold its wartime air base in Cairo to Egypt and acquired a three-year lease to another base in Saudi Arabia. To beleaguered Iran, the United States sent a military mission and issued credit for the purchase of war-surplus equipment. In 1951, along with France, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the United States proposed to Egypt the establishment of a Middle East Command with Egypt as an equal partner, but the Egyptians rejected the proposal.

Following their establishment in Western Europe, the mutual assistance programs were extended to the Middle East. Eventually, Iran, Israel and the seven Arab states of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen shared in the programs. The Truman administration pursued vigorously a plan to bring these countries into the NATO framework to achieve a unified defense of the area. This failing, the United

(Continued on page 53)

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Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, there were "years of crisis, of thaw and chill in the cold war. . . . The military commitments of the United States within Europe remained as firm as ever. . . . Military commitments in the Middle East increased."

The Eisenhower Era

BY JAMES A. HUSTON
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IN RETROSPECT THE Eisenhower years, 1953-1961, seem to have been an era of tranquility between times of turbulence. But those years, too, were years of almost uninterrupted international crises. Actions taken and commitments made then continue to weigh heavily on United States policy and international security.

The year 1953 was a highly significant year for the cold war. General Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office as President of the United States with promises of a "new look" in United States foreign and defense policies; the Soviet Union detonated its first thermonuclear hydrogen bomb (only one year after the first successful test of a hydrogen bomb by the United States); Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin died.

Already some signs indicated at least a measure of flexibility in Soviet policies. Stalin himself, while continuing efforts for the improvement of nuclear weapons, had introduced some retrenchment in conventional forces in the previous year or two. The death of Stalin in March, 1953, and the ensuing power struggle in the Kremlin permitted this trend to continue, and at the nineteenth party congress in October, Soviet leaders displayed a new tolerance toward the satellite states. In uneasy control of the Soviet government, Georgi Malenkov forcefully put down uprisings in East Germany and elsewhere, but at the same time he presented a more conciliatory attitude in resuming diplo-

matic relations with Yugoslavia, Greece and Israel; giving up claims to certain parts of Turkish territory; backing down on demands for joint control of the Turkish straits; and holding out the hope of a peace treaty with West Germany while relinquishing further war claims against that country.

In 1955, Malenkov gave way to N. A. Bulganin as Premier; Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist party, shared power as a kind of Roman consul. The new team of "B. and K." alternated between threats and smiles but generally contributed to a further relaxation of tensions. They espoused a policy which Malenkov already had referred to as "peaceful coexistence."

In May, 1955, after years of fruitless negotiation, the Soviet Union agreed to a peace treaty for Austria; in July, Soviet leaders joined leaders from the United States, Great Britain and France in a "summit" conference at Geneva where they publicly expressed confidence in the peaceful intentions of the United States. Subsequently, the Russians announced a reduction of 640,000 men in their armed forces, established diplomatic relations with West Germany, and agreed to the return of prisoners of war who had been held since World War II. Further, the Soviet Union relinquished its naval base at Porkkala, Finland, where, according to the terms of the treaty, it might have remained until 1997.

Discussions for disarmament and arms con-

trol continued throughout this period, but came to nothing. The Soviets renewed their familiar demands for the complete banning of nuclear weapons, a one-third reduction in the armed forces of the major powers within one year, and the elimination of all military bases on foreign territory. The United States would agree to no such proposals without satisfactory arrangements for international inspection and control. The Soviet Union demurred.

Leaders in the West found new reason to hope for Soviet conciliation after the twentieth party congress in Moscow in February, 1956. Nikita Khrushchev dared boldly to attack the great Stalin himself, and launched a vigorous de-Stalinization campaign. During the next year, Khrushchev eclipsed Bulganin altogether.

"THE NEW LOOK"

Meanwhile, in the United States, the chief spokesman for the Republican party on foreign policy and national security during the political campaign of 1952 was John Foster Dulles, who was slated to become Secretary of State under Eisenhower. Attacking the "containment" policy of the Truman administration, Dulles called for a more positive approach that would move toward rolling back the area of Soviet domination. In an article appearing in *Life* magazine in the spring of 1952—even before Eisenhower had been nominated—Dulles wrote:

These exposed nations feel that they have been put in the "expendable" class, condemned in perpetuity to be the ramparts against which the angry waves of Soviet Communism will constantly hurl themselves. . . .

But liberation from the yoke of Moscow will not occur for a very long time and courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur.¹

Eisenhower himself took up this theme. In an address before the American Legion convention in August he said:

All these people [of Eastern Europe] are blood kin to us. How many people today live in great fear that never again shall they hear from a mother, a grandfather, a brother or a cousin? Dare we rest while these millions of our kinsmen remain in slavery? I can almost hear your answer. . . .²

The danger was that the peoples of the East European satellite states might take such statements as these to mean an encouragement for them to rise in revolt, with an implied promise of United States support. This is what happened in East Germany in 1953 and in Poland and then in Hungary in 1956. Actually, these incidents probably were more the result of the post-Stalin "thaw" in the Kremlin, and a purposeful relaxation of controls on the part of Bulganin and Khrushchev after years of oppression. But there was always a question about the influence of the United States. In this case, clearly, military commitments had failed to match public statements.

As far as defense policy was concerned, Secretary of State Dulles was also the chief spokesman for a policy of "massive retaliation." Apparently a reaction to the dissatisfactions of the Korean War (which had come to a close with the signature of armistice agreements in 1953 after two years of negotiations) and a response to concern about possible involvement in Indochina, "massive retaliation" promised to use American nuclear strength. Dulles had anticipated the policy in the 1952 article in *Life*:

Obviously, we cannot build a 20,000 mile Maginot Line to match the Red armies, man for man, gun for gun, and tank for tank at any particular time or place their general staff selects. To attempt that would mean real strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere.

There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurs anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing.³

This is what the President, with the advice of the National Security Council, had decided. "The basic decision was as I indicated to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of

¹ John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, May 19, 1952, p. 154.

² *The New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1952, p. 12.

³ Dulles, *op. cit.*, pp. 148, 151.

our own choosing." This would permit the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to shape the military establishment "to fit what is our policy instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices."⁴

"Massive retaliation" aroused fears on the part of the allies that they would become involved in a nuclear holocaust at times and places *not* of their own choosing. Adlai Stevenson quickly suggested that such a policy, instead of extending the freedom of choice of the United States, actually narrowed the choice and in every situation of threat posed a terrible dilemma: inaction or nuclear attack. This might, indeed, leave the United States open to constant "nibbling away."

It could be argued that the policy of "massive retaliation" was being put into effect at the very time when it should have been terminated. The Soviet Union had had the atomic bomb since 1949; it had exploded a hydrogen bomb in 1953, and at the May Day parade in 1954 it unveiled an intercontinental jet bomber. Very shortly it seemed clear that "massive retaliation" would itself invite "massive retaliation." The American nuclear deterrent was beginning to lose credibility at the very time that the "new look" was giving it increased prominence.

Nevertheless, President Eisenhower persisted in that "new look." The military program now would be, as Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson put it, to get "more bang for a buck." It had been anticipated that the cessation of hostilities in Korea would permit a substantial reduction in military expenditures, but the President pushed the "new look" further. According to the original program, there was to be a gradual reduction in the strength of the armed forces from 3,300,000 in mid-1954 to 2,815,000 in mid-1957. In December, 1954, it was announced that this schedule would be moved up by a full year, so that the reductions would be in effect by mid-1956. This called for an Army of

1,000,000 men, a strength of 840,000 for the Navy and the Marine Corp, and 975,000 for the Air Force. This meant a net gain of 14,000 for the Air Force, and a loss of 417,000 for the other services.

The national defense budget reflected this trend. While expenditures for the Army and Navy generally went down during the next several years, Air Force expenditures continued to rise, from \$15.6 billion in fiscal year 1954 to \$18.7 billion in 1959. Total expenditures for major items of national defense dropped from \$47.9 billion in the fiscal year 1954 to \$41.8 billion in 1956, and then gradually rose to \$45.8 billion in 1959.

Secretary Dulles added fuel to the consternation of allies with a further clarification of his policies early in 1956. In another article in *Life* magazine he was quoted as saying:

You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, you inevitably get into war . . . you are lost. . . . We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action.⁵

Undoubtedly there was a great deal of truth in what he said. But a public statement about adventures in "brinkmanship" was bound to invite criticism.

COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE

As leader of the coalition military effort in Europe in World War II, and as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under the NATO military structure, President Eisenhower remained firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. After the Korean War, the United States maintained an army force in Europe of five divisions plus armored cavalry regiments, the Berlin garrison, and supporting forces. Nuclear warfare weapons (other than those operated by the Air Force) were added to comprise 20 missile battalions and six battalions of "atomic artillery" (280 mm guns) by 1958.

In the eleven years from the founding of NATO in 1949 through fiscal year 1960, total expenditures of the United States for military

⁴ *The New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1954, p. 2.

⁵ James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," *Life*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 78.

assistance to NATO countries amounted to \$14 billion, while expenditures of those countries on their own defenses totalled \$114 billion. Whatever the difficulties in the military aid program, it clearly was serving, to a considerable degree, its stated purposes of (1) modernizing NATO defense forces while maintaining the effectiveness of forces already developed, (2) inducing countries capable of doing so to assume responsibility for their own material and training needs, and (3) encouraging multilateral efforts in the coordinated development, standardization, and economical production of the best available modern weapons.

A major question about cooperation within NATO and the nature of NATO's defense arrangements hinged on the role of West Germany. The problem was how to bring West German military and economic potential into the defense of Western Europe while satisfying Germany's neighbors that she would not threaten their security.

At a meeting of the Defense Committee in Washington in October, 1950, Jules Moch, the French defense minister, had proposed a far-reaching innovation: why not bring the Germans in as part of a unified European army? After a year's preliminary work, the six nations—France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—developed a comprehensive plan for a European Defense Force to be constituted within the framework of a European Defense Community (E.D.C.). But having proposed E.D.C., France proceeded to kill it when the National Assembly refused to ratify it by voting to remove approval of the treaty from its agenda in August, 1954.

Amidst consternation in Western countries, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden set out to revitalize Western European Union (W.E.U.), to which both Germany and Italy were admitted. Under the arrangement, West Germany was to make 12 divisions available to NATO, but was not to undertake the manufacture of guided missiles without approval from W.E.U. and NATO, and would not manufacture any atomic, chemical, or biological weapons. This paved the way

for the admission of West Germany as a full member of NATO in 1955, which in turn opened the door to her receipt of United States military aid.

Meanwhile, further questions arose on military assistance to countries outside NATO where ideological considerations played a part, particularly Spain and Yugoslavia.

Less sensitive than the President to the misgivings of European allies about granting aid to a fascist regime which had cooperated with Nazi Germany during World War II, Congress had taken the initiative in 1950 and 1951 in voting funds for Spain. But these could not be used until an agreement had been concluded, and this was not forthcoming until September, 1953. By its terms the United States was granted the right to construct a pipeline and air and naval bases in Spain for joint occupation and use with Spanish forces. In return, the United States was to furnish military and economic assistance to Spain to the extent of \$465 million over a four-year period. This arrangement was extended to continue throughout the Eisenhower years.

Although some critics in the United States saw no distinction between one Communist country and another, the Eisenhower administration continued to support the Truman policy of encouraging Yugoslav leader Tito in his independent stand against Moscow by providing assistance for the modernization of Yugoslav forces. United States aid was stepped up after the completion of a Balkan alliance (in August, 1954) in which Yugoslavia joined with Greece and Turkey, and after the settlement (in October of that year) of the Trieste question which had long been a burning issue between Yugoslavia and Italy. However, as Tito warmed to the conciliatory efforts of Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1956, the United States Congress limited further assistance to Yugoslavia.

THE BAGHDAD PACT

For some time the United States had been attempting to promote arrangements for mutual security against possible Communist expansion in the Middle East. The United

States had had a military assistance agreement with Turkey since 1947, and with Iran since 1950. In 1954, it entered into military assistance agreements with Iraq and Pakistan. At the same time it encouraged cooperation among those countries themselves, and with Great Britain, long the main stabilizing influence in the Middle East. These efforts led to a Turkish-Iraqi mutual cooperation pact signed in February, 1955, and adhered to in the course of the next several months, in turn, by the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran. Efforts to obtain the adherence of Jordan to what had become known as the "Baghdad Pact" failed. Though a moving force in its organization, the United States declined formal membership. In April, 1956, it did become a member for all practical purposes when it accepted participation on the group's military and economic committees. At the same time the United States stepped up military assistance to the member countries, including the delivery of jet aircraft to Iran and Pakistan.

Serious questions could be raised about the necessity or even the desirability of the Baghdad Pact. It probably did not add to the United States commitment in the area or to local efforts at mutual defense. The United States was already allied to Turkey through NATO, and to Pakistan through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and had a military assistance agreement with Iran. On the other hand, it is likely that the pact actually increased tensions in the Middle East. Members of the Arab League were particularly outspoken against the pact and Iraq, the only Arab member, was subjected to many charges that she was the tool of a Western plot to split the Arab world. On the other side, India was bitter in her denunciation of this further support for Pakistan.

SUEZ

Furious at the attempts of Egypt's President Abdel Nasser to play off the United States against the Soviet Union in bids for assistance, in July, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the withdrawal of the offer of assistance made a year earlier for the con-

struction of a high dam at Aswan on the upper Nile. A week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and stated that receipts from the canal would finance the dam. In accordance with a new treaty signed in 1954, British troops had withdrawn from Suez only a few weeks before this seizure. Under the terms of the treaty the canal company's concession would terminate in 1968. While a series of hasty diplomatic moves, including the formation of the Suez Canal Users Association, failed to reach any compromise, the Egyptians proceeded to demonstrate that they could operate the canal. The British and French were restive, however, over this threat to their security and their economies by possible blocking of oil shipments from the Middle East as well as over the plight of their stockholders (even though they were promised compensation) in the canal company and in the oil companies which depended upon the canal.

Arab-Israeli tensions remained in the background and, on October 29, Israel struck swiftly at Egypt through the Sinai peninsula. With the benefit of modern weapons, including jet fighters purchased from France, the Israelis swept with surprising speed toward the canal. A British-French ultimatum called upon forces of both sides to remain 10 miles away from the canal. As expected, Israel accepted, Egypt refused, and Anglo-French paratroops and other forces began landing in the canal area. The United States, apparently caught by surprise, found itself aligned with the Soviet Union in demanding the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. (However, the United States did reject as "unthinkable" a Soviet proposal for joint U.S.S.R.-United States intervention.) If the interest of the United States was to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, to keep the Suez Canal open, and to maintain its alliances in good condition, it lost on all three counts.

Perhaps most serious, Khrushchev threatened to launch missiles against London and Paris if the British and French did not withdraw, and the United States made no move

to give any reassurance against this Soviet nuclear blackmail. Subsequently, the United Nations called for withdrawal and provided a United Nations Emergency Force to move into the area as a peace-watching force. With this face-saving arrangement, forces withdrew.

But the scars of Suez persisted. Soviet prominence in the Middle East reached a new high. And British and French confidence in NATO and United States support reached a new low.

HUNGARY

While the attention of the world focused on the Middle East, events in Hungary were testing the nature and effectiveness of United States support for the liberation of the peoples of East Europe. Encouraged by the apparent relaxation in Soviet policy in the course of the "post-Stalin thaw" and inspired by the outcome of riots in Poland, Hungarians rose in October, 1956, to try to regain their freedom from Soviet domination. Temporary success brought a more liberal Hungarian regime, which promptly announced Hungarian neutrality, withdrew from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the United Nations for protection. For a few days the Kremlin remained indecisive. The United States answered Hungarian calls for help with statements of moral support, but with the proviso that the United States would not resort to the use of force. Pressure from Communist China, the deep involvement of the Western powers in Suez and concern that revolt might spread throughout the satellites finally brought decisive and ruthless Russian intervention.

The attitude of the United States toward the Hungarian revolt caused bitter criticism—criticism grown the more bitter because of earlier pronouncements about "rollback" and "liberation." American leaders were quick to point out that they never had encouraged wars of liberation or national uprisings. Officials of the "Voice of America" and of the unofficial "Radio Free Europe" insisted that their broadcasts had not implied any

direct United States support for revolt. Yet the question persists: If the broadcasts of these propaganda stations were not intended to encourage revolt, then what was their purpose? Did they imply United States support, or encourage wishful thinking to expect support?

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The reduction of British and French influence in the Middle East left a partial power vacuum which the United States moved to fill, extending its commitments on the apparent assumption that communism was at the root of all of the difficulties in the area.

On January 5, 1957, just two months after his landslide reelection, President Eisenhower went before Congress to ask for a joint resolution to support a new policy for the Middle East.⁶

Evidently the proposal had been hastily drawn without prior consultation with allies and without formal consideration by the National Security Council. Objections arose in Congress over the legal necessity of "authorizing" the President to do these things and over the vagueness surrounding such terms as "Middle East" and a "nation controlled by international communism." After two months of hearings and debate, Congress finally passed a somewhat watered-down version.

The Baghdad Pact states greeted the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine with some enthusiasm, but in a number of the Arab states, led by Nasser's Egypt, an outcry of opposition arose which, accusing the United States of replacing the imperialism of Britain and France, cancelled the Arab expressions of good will which had come to the United States as a result of its stand in the Suez crisis. Not unexpectedly, the Soviet Union bitterly denounced the policy.

Events in the Middle East were soon to put the doctrine to the test. King Hussein of Jordan terminated the British-Jordanian alliance and dismissed the British general who headed his Arab Legion. Then he became involved in a situation which nearly cost him his throne and Jordan its existence. He

⁶ For excerpts from the text of the Eisenhower Doctrine, see p. 49 of this issue.

moved against his own pro-Nasser government (which had been making overtures to the Soviet Union) and sought support against threatened attacks by Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Israel. The United States made the spectacular response (April, 1957) of dispatching the Sixth Fleet, including the carrier *Forrestal* and 1,800 Marines, to the eastern Mediterranean. It was said that this was the kind of action contemplated under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

A few months later it appeared that Syria would turn to communism, as pro-Nasser army leaders took over the government. Khrushchev accused Turkey of threatening invasions of Syria, and the United States stepped up military aid to neighboring states. This crisis passed but, early in 1958, Syria joined with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic. This seemed to give impetus to pro-Nasser revolutionary groups everywhere. Jordan and Iraq entered into a shaky federation in an attempt to counter the U.A.R. Then revolt erupted in Lebanon, a state whose government always tried to maintain a tenuous balance between Muslims and Christians, and an appeal to the U.N. brought a United Nations Observer Group to Lebanon. In July, there was a bloody coup in Iraq where the king and his uncle and the leader of the government were assassinated. The Lebanese government quickly asked the United States for assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine. Already the Sixth Fleet was cruising in the eastern Mediterranean, and within a day after the request, 5,000 United States Marines landed in Lebanon. Eventually their number reached nearly 14,000. At the same time British paratroops landed in Jordan in response to a request from King Hussein. After the U.N. General Assembly (with the acquiescence of the United Arab Republic) voted to continue the Observer Group in Lebanon and to send a representative of the U.N. Secretary General to Jordan, United States and British forces were withdrawn from those countries.

In 1959, the new leader of Iraq, Abdel Karim Kassim, took his country out of the Baghdad Pact, which was then redesignated

the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the United States provided more support. Eruptions continued through the volatile Middle East. In 1961, Syria suddenly pulled out of the United Arab Republic. In 1963, Kassim was assassinated, and a professedly more anti-Western regime took over Iraq. Still the Soviets had been able to consolidate no major holdings in the area.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE?

The launching of the Soviet satellite, *Sputnik*, in 1957, raised grave concern in the United States that this country had fallen far behind in the race for supremacy in intercontinental missiles. Nevertheless, in the broader context of the cold war, the period of 1958–1960 was one of relatively amicable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as Khrushchev soft-pedaled earlier demands, and gave some sign of seeking a real rapprochement. After his tour of the United States and meetings with President Eisenhower in Washington and at the presidential retreat at Camp David, there seemed to be a new "spirit of Camp David." Out of this came an agreement to hold a summit conference in Paris in May, 1960, for the purpose of negotiations on Berlin, the future of Germany, a nuclear test ban, and reduction and control of armaments.

Just two weeks before the conference was to open, a United States U-2 photo-reconnaissance plane was shot down deep inside the borders of the Soviet Union. Contrary to all the rules of the game of espionage, Eisenhower not only admitted that the United States had been engaging in espionage, but accepted full responsibility. Khrushchev, who prob-

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This author surveys changing United States relations with NATO, and the fluctuations in our relationship with the U.S.S.R. from 1960 to 1968. He points out that "As President Johnson prepared to leave office, the crisis in the Middle East and Czechoslovakia had caused a serious deterioration of what had been the easing of United States and Russian tensions. The basic military and foreign policy commitments of the United States were rejuvenated and restated. . . ."

The Kennedy-Johnson Years

BY THOMAS T. HELDE
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IN HIS INAUGURAL address on January 20, 1961, President John F. Kennedy stated a traditional American goal and made a reinvigorated pledge to attempt to achieve it:

. . . we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

A large part of the American military commitment to achieve this goal lay in Europe. During the nearly three years of Kennedy's term, dramatic changes took place with respect to the United States and Europe: old tensions were eased and new ones were created in a period in which both political affiliations and technological military capabilities underwent notable alteration. The directions which these negotiations took were, broadly, four:

- (1) the American commitment to NATO;
- (2) the German problem;
- (3) relationships with the U.S.S.R. and the Communist world; and
- (4) problems of armament and disarmament.

All four of these matters were closely intertwined during the Kennedy and the Johnson years.

During the administration of Dwight Eisenhower the United States commitment to NATO had developed on the basis of the concept that America was facing the Com-

munist world: according to this concept Europe, protected by the United States, remained an outpost of the defense of America. By the spring of 1961, strong pressures developed from President Charles de Gaulle of France and from Great Britain for a changing concept of the NATO alliance, to give European members a position as truly European powers and, in particular, not to deny them their individual nuclear capacities. But Kennedy believed that the time had come to rehabilitate the conventional defenses of NATO, and that nuclear capacity should be an alliance-wide responsibility. On May 17, the President offered five Polaris missile atomic submarines to the NATO command and suggested the creation of a seaborne multilateral force to provide nuclear defense on a joint, rather than national, basis.

In late May, Kennedy went to Europe to attempt to deal with both friend and foe. De Gaulle proved as independent as ever in his wishes for a stronger French position with respect to NATO and Europe. But it was the U.S.S.R.'s Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna who provided the surprises. In addition to turning down Kennedy's proposal for a ban on the testing of nuclear arms, he asked for a German peace settlement which would recognize the East German regime and materially change the occupation

position of the Western allies in Berlin. If this could not be done with Western cooperation, then it would have to be done without it, and in 1961. Coming on the heels of the Bay of Pigs disaster of April,¹ Khrushchev's demands were worrisome and humiliating. The new President returned to Washington to push for increased defense appropriations, to call up some of the reserves and to pledge United States support for Berlin.

During the summer, the European situation took a turn for the worse. On August 13, the East German government closed the border between the Soviet zone of Berlin and the zones occupied by the United States, Great Britain and France, in order to seal the last opening through which East Germans could migrate to the West. This action was in violation of the agreements of the occupying powers, which were still in force because no German peace treaty had been concluded. At the end of the month, Russia announced it would resume nuclear tests, which the Big Three had kept in abeyance since 1958 while the possibilities of a nuclear test ban were being discussed. The United States resumed tests in September.

In the fall, although test-ban discussions were abortive and the United States continued to build up its conventional armaments in NATO, the immediacy of the crisis over Germany was moderated. In October, Khrushchev indicated that the settlement he had demanded would not, after all, have to be negotiated in 1961. Although he kept the Berlin problem alive, he did not bring it to a showdown, probably because of Russian hesitancy over relations with Communist China, as evidenced by the problem of the affiliation of Albania in the Communist bloc. Throughout 1962, Berlin remained a nagging issue. Shortly after the anniversary of the partition of Berlin, in the wake of Soviet alterations of military responsibility in East Berlin in favor of East Germany, the three Western powers protested these actions and

asserted their commitments to protect the rights and interests of Berlin.

But it was Cuba, more than Berlin, that brought United States-Soviet relations to the crisis point in 1962; and the forthright declaration of President Kennedy on October 27 brought a Soviet retreat from the island. Why did Russia back down in Cuba and, at the same time, fail to press her claims with respect to Germany? Not only had her military incursions into Cuba been detected prematurely, but growing tensions between Moscow and Peking, to which China's attack on India was only one contributor, together with economic problems at home, placed the U.S.S.R. in anything but a dominant position by the end of 1962.

In the next months, the rift in the Communist world became strikingly apparent. In January, 1963, Khrushchev turned a cold shoulder to China's wish to present her case at a meeting of world Communist parties. This introduced several months of touchy relationships climaxed in July when talks on ideological problems between the two powers in Moscow broke down. Of special significance to the developing relaxation of East-West tensions was the change of view the Russians brought to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, which had been meeting intermittently in Geneva (without one member, France) since March, 1963. In June, the Russians agreed to the principle of the "hot line," or direct communication between Moscow and Washington in the event of an emergency. Of particular importance was Khrushchev's decision to accept a nuclear test-ban treaty with the West without his previously demanded NATO-Warsaw Pact alliance. To be sure, the knotty problem of underground testing was not settled, but agreement was reached not to test nuclear weapons where an international inspection system was unnecessary—in outer space, in the air or beneath the water. This important agreement was signed on August 5 and ratified on October 10, 1963.

Paradoxically, the easing of tensions with Russia because of the apparent split of the Communist "monolith" made relations among

¹ For details of this abortive attempt to invade Cuba, see Lester Langley, "Military Commitments in Latin America: 1960-1968," in *Current History*, June, 1969, pp. 346ff.

the members of NATO more difficult. These problems centered, first, on the unwillingness of France to feel herself subordinated in a United States-dominated alliance, and, second, on the problem of nuclear weapons and their use among the members of the alliance.

In the fall of 1962, the United States, for technical reasons, decided to end the development of the Skybolt air-to-ground missile which had been promised to Great Britain. This change caused serious frictions which were only partly settled by the Nassau meeting of Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in December, 1962, at which the United States agreed to provide Great Britain with Polaris missiles for her own defense. Great Britain agreed to the concept of a NATO nuclear force, earlier foreshadowed by President Kennedy, and to use Polaris missiles unilaterally only in the event of greatest emergency. At Nassau, also, the decision was made to offer the Polaris missile to de Gaulle.

On January 14, 1963, President de Gaulle roundly criticized the Nassau arrangements, turned down the Polaris missile, announced that France would develop her own nuclear force, and inveighed against the proposed admission of Great Britain to the European Economic Community. During the succeeding months, France pressed for a reorganization of NATO which would make United States influence less dominant in the alliance, and steadfastly stood against the proposed multinational nuclear force (M.L.F.)—a truly international naval force armed with nuclear weapons. In general, Germany favored the M.L.F.; but the British were qualified in their enthusiasm. On this uncertain basis, the problems of NATO and its nuclear power continued into the winter. On November 22, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, and although President Lyndon Johnson announced a continuation of policy, one stage of United States leadership with respect to Europe had ended.

PROBLEMS FOR JOHNSON

As President Johnson took over at the close of 1963, the problems of NATO and

the Russians remained. For the December meeting of the NATO Council, Johnson prepared a message emphasizing Kennedy's concept of a European partnership in NATO. Despite United States interest in M.L.F., its concept of partnership still defined NATO as an organization for conventional forces, for which the United States would be the holder and supplier of the nuclear deterrents. But such were not the concepts of President de Gaulle, who was not sure whether the United States would use nuclear deterrents to protect a member nation. In contrast, de Gaulle advocated the establishment of national nuclear forces, together with a revision of the NATO command organization, which would give individual members a greater share of responsibility for the defense of their own territories. The French were not successful in achieving these alterations in the spring of 1964, but when the United States pushed M.L.F. during the year, France opposed it, and in the fall the French put pressure on Germany, through the European Economic Community, to drop her support of M.L.F. Nonetheless, at the NATO Council meeting in December, Dean Rusk, United States Secretary of State, and Robert McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense, stated the case for M.L.F. so strongly that the concept remained alive.

In the meantime, the new President and Khrushchev had exchanged conciliatory messages, and in January, 1964, the Russians threw out a trial balloon, offering a multilateral treaty to renounce force, with a variety of exceptions. Johnson responded by urging a strengthening of the United Nations. Despite the frictions caused when Soviet fighters shot down two United States planes over East Germany, the general trend of United States-Russian relations was amicable. But the two prolonged sessions of the Disarmament Committee in 1964 were unproductive because of the completely different concepts of the reduction of armaments proposed by the two nations. On October 16, Communist China announced her first successful nuclear test, climaxing a year of technical development that had also been filled with ideologi-

cal tensions with the U.S.S.R. In August, China sharply rejected a Russian invitation to Communist parties for a formal conference to discuss their differences. Coincidentally, on the same day, Khrushchev was overthrown.

In February, 1965, the United States began increasing its commitments to South Vietnam, commitments which were to become an all-engrossing aspect of Johnson's full presidential term. In April, the revolt in the Dominican Republic and United States intervention there provided another absorbing problem for the administration.² European matters tended to seem less immediately crucial, though no less pressing.

In a sense, de Gaulle's February press conference set the tone for the year. Critical of United States leadership in Europe, he urged a revamping of the United Nations, a new approach to the German question which might come near to meeting Russian wishes, and European leadership of European defense. With respect to NATO, the French wanted individual nations to be able to use nuclear weapons for self defense immediately, instead of relying on the NATO policy of attempting to repel attack by conventional methods, resorting to nuclear means only when necessary. In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that M.L.F. (and a proposed British alternative) expired slowly during the year, despite the experimental cruise of the United States guided-missile destroyer *Claude V. Ricketts* with a six-nation crew.

But the most striking French action of 1965 concerned the organizations of European integration—the European Economic Community and the affiliated European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom. The growing pattern of political and economic unity that distinguished these organizations was, like NATO, too "integrative" for the French, and at the end of June they boycotted the Common Market and its affiliated organizations. The boycott lasted until the end of January, 1966, when things were smoothed over with an agreement providing for a more national and less integrative approach to community affairs.

² See Langley, *op. cit.*

FRANCE AND NATO

The pattern of French policy seen in France's attitude toward the Common Market was reflected in NATO. Because of French disaffection with NATO's organizational and strategic structure, and French fears that Germany might secure nuclear weapons through NATO, the French announced in March, 1966, that they would withdraw their troops stationed in Germany from the NATO command, and would also withdraw from the integrated NATO structure by July 1: Moreover, the Supreme Headquarters and other NATO organs located in France would have to leave the country by April 1, 1967. Although the French maintained that they would not breach the NATO treaty, and that their actions only altered the alliance to bring it more nearly into harmony with current conditions, their action was of real concern to the other members. There was the complicated and expensive process of moving installations to other nations. The entire role of France in the West European defense pattern was radically changed. By the end of 1966, despite problems of financing and deployment, the plans were ready for NATO's headquarters to move to Belgium.

The easing of tensions between West and East that had been apparent since 1963 continued in a variable and uncertain way into 1967. The Soviet Union's interest in the Vietnam conflict was worrisome, to be sure, but both the Soviet Union and the United States avoided direct conflict. De Gaulle had sought, in varied ways, the participation of the Soviet Union in his concept of European policy. Even the German situation seemed to moderate with the new government of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, which attempted to soften relations with the East while maintaining its close affiliation with the West.

But a new dimension in East-West relations appeared with the outbreak of the Israeli war with Egypt and Jordan on June 5, 1967. The Russians enthusiastically took advantage of the opportunity to aid the Arab states with arms, and to increase the strength of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean to

approximate that of the United States Sixth Fleet. De Gaulle took a harshly anti-Israeli position. The United States, generally sympathetic to Israel, supported U.N. action designed to seek a satisfactory solution to the problem. The Russian tendency to take advantage of the situation brought new worries to the United States, particularly because the NATO members in the eastern Mediterranean area, Greece and Turkey, had long been at loggerheads over the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, the frictions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. remained short of outright conflict and both sides, as evidenced by the conversations held by President Johnson and Premier Aleksei Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, in June, appeared willing to agree to disagree.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW FRICTIONS

By the end of 1967, NATO was adjusting to the new arrangements demanded by de Gaulle. In particular, it was absorbed with the problems posed by the changes in international affairs. Both Great Britain and the United States were concerned with the need for economies in NATO operations, while the new East-West frictions over Vietnam and the Middle East seemed to increase the need for NATO to function in a political role to maintain peace, rather than to act merely as a military deterrent to war. In this respect, by the beginning of 1968, NATO began to show considerable evolution. But 1968 was to prove a year of special difficulties and new frictions in European relationships.

Nevertheless, the early months of 1968 seemed to hold some promise. When President de Gaulle and Chancellor Kiesinger met for their regular talks in accord with the Franco-German agreement of 1963, they agreed on Great Britain's future entry into the E.E.C. Furthermore, de Gaulle told Kiesinger that he would not denounce the NATO treaty in 1968 except in the event of some unforeseen circumstance. With respect to NATO and the British problem of troop commitments, Great Britain's plan to eliminate her military commitments east of

Suez would make it possible for her to pledge more troops for Europe.

With March came the completion of the work on the problems of nuclear proliferation by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee which had been continuing, in various sessions and with varying degrees of optimism, since 1965. In the previous months, and in particular since the Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro, the United States and the U.S.S.R. had solved the knotty problem of inspection of nuclear facilities, agreeing that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be the appropriate inspecting agency. This agreement made it possible for the Disarmament Committee to recommend to the United Nations General Assembly a draft treaty to limit nuclear proliferation.

Simultaneously, the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. pledged the aid of a nuclear signatory to the treaty to a non-nuclear nation if such a nation were attacked by a nuclear power. This arrangement met the objections of many nonnuclear states to the treaty by giving them a guarantee of protection from nuclear attack. The United Nations approved these arrangements in June, 1968, and 62 nations, including the United States, Great Britain and Russia, signed the treaty on July 1.

But in the glow of the nuclear nonproliferation agreement, East-West frictions resumed in Germany, an old trouble spot. In June, the East German government had placed new travel regulations on West Germans traveling between West Germany and West Berlin. The United States, Great Britain and France protested, and NATO retaliated with

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This expert suggests that "The United States should determine its position and pursue its policies in the Middle East in the light of its own broad and basic interests in the peace, security and welfare of the peoples of that area."

The U. S. in the Middle East Today

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

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THE UNITED STATES is interested in the Middle East as an intercontinental crossroads between Eurasia and Africa and in the "wells of power" in Middle Eastern oil. It is basically concerned with the peace, security, welfare and orderly development of the peoples of that area. Without that concern, and without some understanding of the area and of the culture, the hopes and aspirations of the peoples in the region, it may be doubted that the United States can achieve whatever objectives it may have in the Middle East.

While the American people have been associated with the Middle East for some 150 years, or even more, especially in the American missionary-educational-philanthropic and business enterprises, United States politico-strategic interests date only from World War II, when President Franklin Roosevelt declared the defense of Turkey (1941) and the Middle East (1944) essential to the defense of the United States.¹ The enduring Ameri-

can military commitments in the Middle East came only after World War II, in response to the Soviet threat in the area.

While the United States has maintained the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea since 1946 (with a naval ancestry in a Mediterranean squadron dating back to 1816), and has the Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, an Air Force training mission in Saudi Arabia, naval units in the Persian Gulf, and some 10,000 to 15,000 troops in Turkey, it has no military commitments other than those briefly outlined above. There are statements of policy, embodying assurances both to Israel and the Arab States over the past 20 years, as in the Anglo-Franco-American Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, but there are no formal engagements involving the use of United States armed forces. Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson all stated the American "interest and concern in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity" of the Middle Eastern states. But these were statements of policy and not commitments "to take particular actions in particular circumstances." While conflicts in the Middle East have been of much concern to the United States over the years, the use of armed forces "can have especially serious consequences for international peace extending far beyond" the Middle East, and the United States has stated its position in order to "use its influence in the cause of peace."²

¹ The Department of State, *The Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers*, 1941, III, 928-929; 1944, V, 1.

² U.S. *Commitments to Foreign Powers*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, on S. Res. 151 Relating to United States Commitments to Foreign Powers. August 16, 17, 21, 23, and September 19, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1967), pp. 50-51, for letter of Assistant Secretary of State William B. McComber, Jr., to Senator J. William Fulbright, August 15, 1967. For more detailed analysis of United States commitments in these periods, see the other articles in this issue.

This position, as embodied in formal commitments and statements, has been taken in the light of the basic interests of the United States—which brings us back to the problem of identifying the essential interests. While they have been stated at the outset, they may now be summarized in somewhat more detail.³ First, it may be assumed that the United States has an interest in the communications facilities in the Middle East—the Mediterranean Sea, the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, and the nexus of international airways, with overflight rights in the area.⁴ Second, it has a very important interest in access to Middle Eastern oil under orderly and reasonable arrangements. This is not merely an interest in the United States investment of some \$3 billion or in the fact that some \$1.7 billion flows annually to the United States from investments. The Middle Eastern "wells of power" contain about two-thirds to three-fourths of the world's proved oil reserves, account for about one-third of the current world production, and supply West Europe with half of its requirements, and Japan with about 90 per cent of her needs. Denial of access might well cripple important allies of the United States.

For very obvious reasons the United States is also concerned with the maintenance of friendly governments in the Middle East, and with the development and influence of its long-standing and broadly based cultural and educational ties with the area as embodied, for example, in Robert College (1863), the American University of Beirut (1866), and the American University in Cairo (1919).

³ In general, see George Lenczowski, Project Director, *United States Interests in the Middle East* (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1968).

⁴ For an excellent summary see *ARAMCO Handbook: Oil and the Middle East* (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: ARAMCO, 1968), pp. 77–103.

⁵ *Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Collection of State Papers*, Department of State Bulletin Supplement, Vol. XVI, No. 409 A (May 4, 1947), pp. 827–909. See also Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations 1947* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University, 1949), pp. 642–688. For excerpts from the text, see p. 49 of this issue.

⁶ For texts see Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1957), I, 853–871.

It is, of course, basically interested in preventing the Middle East from falling under Soviet domination and, at the same time, in avoiding a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

NATO AND CENTO

While the United States commitments to Greece and Turkey had their origins in the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947,⁵ it was only with Greek and Turkish adherence to NATO, on February 15, 1952, as noted above, that direct military commitments on the part of the United States were involved.⁶

While there has been a general weakening of NATO ties, in view of recent French policy, there appears little question as to the usefulness of the alliance. There has also been a specific weakening of the alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly because of the Greco-Turkish controversy over the problem of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the Turkish government recently reaffirmed its adherence to the grand alliance, especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. Greece and Turkey, with significant ground and other forces, and their position in the Eastern Mediterranean, still constitute an important southern NATO flank. There is little question that NATO serves the security interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean and along the Northern Tier of the Middle East, as well as the security interests of Greece and Turkey. During November 15–16, 1968, the NATO Council observed that "the new uncertainties resulting from Soviet actions" extended to the Mediterranean, and it warned that "clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences." There is a NATO base at Izmir and there are facilities at Alexandretta, to say nothing of other installations, and some 15,000 United States troops in Turkey.

That there are some basic difficulties is also clear. In June, 1964, when Turkey threatened to use troops in Cyprus, President Johnson raised a question about United

States commitments to Turkey under NATO in the event that Turkey became involved with the Soviet Union.⁷ There is also the question of whether advances in military technology and missile weaponry render the alliance obsolete. While final answers cannot be given, there is every evidence that political and military leaders do not think so.

Although the NATO commitments to Greece and Turkey are direct and clear, some questions may be raised relative to the nature of the United States involvement in CENTO (the former Baghdad Pact), of which Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom are members.⁸ The United States played an essential role at its foundation during 1955, but did not become a formal member, although it has participated both in committee meetings and in the Ministerial Council. It may be recalled, however, that Turkey and the United Kingdom are NATO members. In addition, under the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, the United States entered into bilateral arrangements with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, on March 5, 1959,⁹ providing that, in the event of aggression, and in accordance with the Constitution, the United States would "take such action, including the use of armed forces," as might be "mutually agreed upon," and as was envisaged in the Eisenhower Doctrine, to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, and to assist the government concerned at its request.

Many questions have been raised about the

⁷ Text in *Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1966, pp. 386-393.

⁸ *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents*, 1950-1955, I, 1257-1259, for texts.

⁹ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1963), pp. 1020-1022.

¹⁰ See Cyrus L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, March 13, 1969.

¹¹ For the Rusk statement see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1966* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1969), pp. 512-515, 515-516. In general, see also John C. Campbell, *Defense of the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1961), *passim*.

¹² Former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, "On the Road to the State," *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (January 31, 1964), 14-16, states that "aside from the Yishuv itself, we had no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist movement."

United States responsibility for CENTO and its commitments under that regional arrangement. There are those who argue that the alliance should not have been formed in the first place, since it was not a valid defense system and only served further to split the Arab states into neutralist, pro-Soviet and pro-Western states, without offering any positive advantages to the United States in its efforts to bolster the Middle East against Communist infiltration. They also note that CENTO's sole Arab member, Iraq, withdrew after the coup d'état of July, 1958, and that Pakistan is no longer an effective member.¹⁰ While CENTO was designed as a barrier to possible Soviet moves in the Middle East, the Soviet Union soon hurdled it and inaugurated its own close ties, especially with Syria, Egypt and, after 1958, with revolutionary Iraq.

There is also a question, granted its geographical location, as to viable defense arrangements with Iran. While there is no direct commitment of United States forces, as in the instance of NATO, the possibility of their use is foreseen. It may, indeed, be doubted that CENTO is effective as a regional military security arrangement, although much work has been accomplished in the economic and technical fields. Whatever CENTO's defects, however, there would appear to be sound psycho-political and other reasons for keeping it in being. As United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk indicated in April, 1966, "the need for this defensive shield continues," and it is probable that this is all the more true after the events of June, 1967, and the enhancement of the Soviet position in the Middle East.¹¹

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

The special relationship between the United States and Israel lies in the essential role which the United States played in the establishment of Israel during 1945-1948, in the general sympathy in the United States for Israel as a haven and refuge, and in the ties between the new state and its people and American Zionists.¹² Be all that as it may, it is well to recall that President Truman was determined to avoid the use of United States

forces in the Middle East during 1947–1948, when he feared that the partition of Palestine (as embodied in the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1947) might involve the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The establishment of Israel on May 15, 1948, however, and the intensification of the conflict raised grave fears. In response to this complicated series of problems and the potentialities for more serious trouble, in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, France, the United Kingdom and the United States sought to avoid a Middle East arms race and recognized that both Israel and the Arab states needed to maintain their armed forces at a certain level to assure internal security, legitimate self-defense and an ability to play a role in regional defense.¹³ Moreover, the three Powers declared

their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.

The Tripartite Declaration was soon violated in the shipment of French arms to Israel, and it probably became invalid for both France and the United Kingdom after the Suez conflict of 1956. But it remained a foundation stone of United States policy relative to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as reiterated on numerous occasions by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. It involved no military commitments directly to

¹³ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), II, pp. 308–311, for text and official Israeli and Arab statements; *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, II, pp. 2237–2238.

¹⁴ Department of State, *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1957), pp. 290–292; *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1957* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1961), pp. 783–858.

¹⁵ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1963* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1967), pp. 580–581.

Israel or the Arab states, but it was a statement of policy.

On the public record, at least, no presidential statement since 1950 has gone beyond the Tripartite Declaration. Neither President Eisenhower nor Secretary of State Dulles did so during 1956–1957. Mr. Dulles did not do so in the aide memoire of February 11, 1957,¹⁴ relative to passage of the Strait of Tiran or the Gulf of Aqaba as a price for Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula or the Gaza Strip. He merely stated that the United States considered that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway and that no nation had the right to "prevent free and innocent passage in the gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto." The United States, he said, "on behalf of vessels of United States registry," was "prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right." Following Israel's withdrawal, the United States was prepared publicly to declare that it would "use its influence, in concert with other United Nations members, to the end that . . . these other measures will be implemented."

Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson do not appear to have gone beyond these expressions of policy, although considerable pressure and propaganda were exerted to have them do so, even to urging negotiation of a special security arrangement with Israel. Nevertheless, on May 8, 1963, President Kennedy restated the basic policy that the United States supported "the security of both Israel and her neighbors" and sought "to limit the Near East arms race"; reminiscent of the 1950 Declaration, he repeated the United States opposition to the use or threat of force, in the event of which the United States would "support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression," which, of course, had been "the policy which the United States has followed for some time."¹⁵ President Johnson sounded much the same note on numerous occasions, notably on May 23 and June 19, 1967, in the period of the *blitzkrieg*, but there

was no commitment as to the use of armed forces.¹⁶

In view of the basic role which the United States played in the establishment of the state, it may well have a kind of moral obligation to support the existence of Israel, although this involves neither military support nor identification with the policies of the Israeli government. Ardent supporters of Israel argue that the United States has a "vital" interest in Israel because she is the only "democratic" society in the Middle East, and that she should be the chosen instrument of United States policy in the area. These Americans urge that the peace and security of the Middle East and the maintenance of American interests can best be served by a strong Israel, backed by political, military and financial aid, along with a security guarantee. To the older arguments based on sympathetic concern for democratic institutions is now added the assertion that Israel could be useful to the United States in a military sense and could contribute significantly to the peace and security of the Middle East.

In addition to its basic economic assistance, the United States became a supplier of arms to Israel in 1962, and especially in 1966.¹⁷ Yet it is doubtful that a special military or security arrangement would be in the interest of either country. As Prime Minister Ben-Gurion pointed out as early as 1952, there

¹⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, *Documents on American Foreign Policy 1967* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 10-17, 123-125.

¹⁷ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1966* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1969), p. 512. On December 27, 1968, the United States agreed to sell 50 Phantom F-4 jets to Israel in order to maintain the military "balance" in the Middle East, in view of the continued supply of Soviet arms in the area, especially to the U.A.R. On Israel's overall basic military superiority over the Arab states, see Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, March 16, 1969.

¹⁸ David Ben-Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), pp. 478-479.

¹⁹ In general, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 461-464.

²⁰ For basic recent documentation see Department of State, *United States Policy in the Near East Crisis* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1967); *A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1967). 90th Congress, 1st Session.

is no identity of interests between the United States and Israel. The United States, he remarked, has not undertaken and would not undertake¹⁸

to back Israel in all it does or asks. America has its own considerations and they differ from Israel's, or even run counter to them. Israel, too, has its own considerations and, if they need not run counter to America's, equally they have not been identical with them.

The United States, it may well be argued, should neither give Israel *carte blanche* in support of her policies nor become involved in their consequences. To embark upon such a course, moreover, would not only serve further to polarize United States policy in the Middle East, but would probably alienate the Arab world and indicate that the United States, in reality, had few interests therein worth considering. It would also neglect the basic United States interest in containment of the Arab-Israeli conflict—in avoiding a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union (which also has some interests in the Middle East). Such a policy might well maintain Israel as a Western or American beachhead in the Middle East and lend credence to the Arab charge that Israel is primarily a Western outpost.¹⁹

As noted above, the United States, from time to time, has also expressed concern and interest in the Arab world, as it has in the case of Israel. The United States is interested in the maintenance of "friendly" Arab governments; it has rendered both economic and military assistance to Jordan and has provided Saudi Arabia with an air defense system. But it has entered into no "alliance" or military commitments with the Arab states or with Israel.²⁰

ALTERNATIVE COURSES

The United States should determine its position and pursue its policies in the Middle East in the light of its own broad and basic interests in the peace, security and welfare of the peoples of that area. One of the guidelines for American policy is embodied in Washington's Farewell Address, in the plea to all citizens to "observe good faith and justice

towards all Nations," and the warning against both "inveterate antipathies against particular Nations" and "passionate attachment for others." Our first President observed that a "passionate attachment," among other things, facilitated "the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists."²¹ Former Governor William W. Scranton has recently called for more "even-handed" policies in the Middle East. Eugene R. Black, the former president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has warned that, "if we are to exert an influence in the Middle East which does more than reflect the limitations of our awesome military power, we must finally adopt policies which make the exercise of influence possible," and has hinted that political leaders in the United States will "have to sacrifice some partisan appeals here at home in the name of promoting settlement in the Middle East."²²

A few alternative courses of action appear open to the United States, all of which involve very complicated problems.²³ Simply stated, these are: 1) the maintenance of existing alliances with and commitments to Greece, Turkey and Iran, or modification thereof; 2) cooperation with the Arab world as the most effective barrier to further Soviet penetration of the Middle East and support

of basic United States interests; 3) an open alliance with Israel, as urged by some American citizens; 4) cooperation with the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict and to promote peace and security in the Middle East; and 4) vigorous support for action within the framework of the United Nations under the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967.²⁴ None of these alternatives offers a certain and simple "solution" to the complex problems that confront the United States, and some are not mutually exclusive.

President Richard Nixon, who considers the Middle East "very explosive" and a "powder keg" which needs to be defused, has indicated that he intends to take initiatives in new directions with new leadership. He has proposed to attack the problems along five fronts, with all-out support for Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring's United Nations mission, bilateral and four-power discussions with France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, talks with Israel and the Arab States, and consideration of long-range economic development in the Middle East. In the event of an agreed settlement, he has suggested, as did Secretary of State Dulles in 1955, the possibility of a "major power guarantee." The President has taken his position, evidently, in the light of the basic United States interest in the containment of the conflict, which could otherwise very well involve "a confrontation between the nuclear powers—which we want to avoid."²⁵ Provided the United States shows a genuinely fair disposition relative to both Israel and the Arab States, pursues an "even-handed" policy based on its broad and long-standing interests, demonstrates an understanding of fundamental issues, and closes no doors, there would appear to be some prospect of more orderly adjustment in the Middle East.²⁶

²¹ For text see Henry Steele Commager and Allan Nevins, eds., *The Heritage of America* (Boston: Little Brown, 1951), pp. 201–215.

²² An address by the Honorable Eugene R. Black before the Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., October 4, 1968.

²³ See Bernard Reich, *New Directions in US Middle East Policy* (McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1969); George Lenczowski, *United States Interests in the Middle East*, pp. 97–118.

²⁴ See especially Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

²⁵ See President Nixon's press conferences of January 27, February 6, March 4, 14, 1969 in *The New York Times*, January 28, February 7, March 5, 15, 1969. For the Dulles program see *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, II, pp. 2176–2180.

²⁶ For a highly responsible presentation of Arab views concerning these problems, and attitudes and reflections relative to United States policy see Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967," *The Arab World: Special Issue*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 10–11 (1969).

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"In view of the unsettled political problems of Europe and the unreliability and unpredictability of Soviet politics, the continuation of United States military commitments in West Europe is a strategic and political necessity...."

The U.S. and Europe Today

BY STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

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IN VIEW OF MANY changes in international politics and in the domestic needs of the United States, is it desirable and realistic for the United States to continue its NATO¹ and Spanish associations along the lines developed during the last two decades? Are these associations in our national interest and are they in the interest of the European states and world peace? A meaningful answer to these questions involves the examination of some major developments in international politics during the last two decades.

The avoidance of an all-out conflict has become one of the mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. Some further success in strategic arms control negotiations concerning missiles and nuclear weapons could create a measure of accommodation if not understanding between them. The growing strength of China and her hostility toward the U.S.S.R. might have a moderating influence on the Soviet Union's European policy. Sino-Soviet relations might bring surprises, and the arms control negotiations will last for a long time indeed. During this period, many unexpected developments may take place in the U.S.S.R. and China—two empires in which there are no provisions for an orderly succession of the rulers, and in which policy decisions are made by only a few party mem-

bers. Although the basic antagonism between the two giant powers will be of long duration, a post-Mao Tse-tung regime might well re-establish friendly relations with Moscow. Even a most unlikely Sino-Soviet war could end with the installation of a pro-Soviet regime in Peking.

Sudden changes are possible in the U.S.S.R. as well. There are several contradictory trends in the Soviet Union's party hierarchy. Stalemates are not uncommon. A conciliatory but firm Western policy might help the forces of moderation in the Kremlin, while a policy of unilateral Western concessions would play into the hands of the Kremlin hawks.

Since NATO's establishment, the greatest change in the military balance occurred when the United States monopoly in atomic weapons was replaced by the present quasi-parity of the American and Soviet thermonuclear arsenals and missiles. Although in Joseph Stalin's heyday the Soviet power threatened to spill over on powerless West European countries, the United States guarantee was not questioned mainly because of the superiority of the United States weapons systems. With the rapid development of the Soviet thermonuclear and missile capabilities, a kind of credibility gap developed. The French and some other European nations expressed doubts as to the American willingness to risk the nuclear destruction of the North American continent because of Soviet occupation of some more territories in Europe. The changing strategic concepts from massive retaliation

¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was originally composed of Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany acceded in 1955.

to flexible response and various formulas for more European participation in contingency planning and symbolic sharing of atomic weapons in the form of a Multilateral Nuclear Force or an Atlantic Nuclear Force did not dispel European anxieties. In fact, some of these concepts generated new misunderstandings and apprehensions within the alliance.

The massive United States military intervention in Vietnam created further concern about the effects of the United States policies on Europe and members of the alliance. Fear was expressed that Europe might automatically become a theater of war, because the Vietnamese conflict or other United States military involvements could erupt into a world conflagration. Such considerations led to France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military defense system and to the relocation of SHAPE and other military organizations and the North Atlantic Council from France to Belgium and other NATO countries. Although some United States policies—such as the privileged treatment of Great Britain in the atomic field or by the terms of the Nassau agreement—violated legitimate French interests, there is no evidence that any reasonable American policy could have changed the policies of French President Charles de Gaulle. Whatever the formal justification or the real reason, the French withdrawal from NATO's military organization and the uncertainties of Gaullist diplomacy considerably weakened the North Atlantic Alliance.

Another important change in the North Atlantic area was the rapid renaissance of West Europe's economic power. The fabulous success of the European Recovery Program after World War II created unprecedented prosperity in Europe. However, this was not followed by a comparable increase in political and military power. The affluent West European states, squeezed between the two superpowers, have had a diminishing influence in world affairs. The ambitions and endeavors of Gaullist diplomacy for a worldwide role were rather pathetic. In the technological age, despite the explosion of nationalism in some countries, only the industrially devel-

oped large states are able to muster genuine military strength—including modern conventional and nuclear armaments and the many ramifications of sea power. Far-sighted statesmen initiated policies for European unification, but their objectives have not been attained. During the past decades, obsolete nationalistic considerations prevailed in decisive moments. Negative British attitudes in the 1950's and French policies in the 1960's prevented the formation of a large political entity which could have reestablished West Europe as a powerful political force in world affairs.

Since NATO was created as a defensive organization against further Soviet expansion in Europe, the changes in the Communist world and in Soviet policies have influenced the attitudes of NATO member states. The cohesion and effectiveness of the alliance depended to a large extent on the appearance of the Soviet threat and the various NATO members' assessments of that threat. There were periods during the regime of Stalin's successors when the Soviet danger seemed to subside and most NATO countries relaxed. Wishful thinking in the West constituted the background of a policy of détente which was followed by most Western countries. It was suggested that the new Soviet leaders would be anxious to follow a policy of rapprochement with the United States but that American involvement in Vietnam made this policy difficult if not impossible for them. Such ideas have been repeated time and again in Western publications. Eventually, the image of a greatly mellowed Soviet leadership emerged in the Western imagination. A host of revisionist publications presented the image of an innocent Soviet Union which was forced into defensive actions after World War II by an aggressive and imperialistic United States.

The leading NATO nations competed in a policy of bridge-building toward the East European states as well as toward Moscow. Britain and subsequently several other Western countries supplemented trade agreements with long-term credit arrangements. Moscow concluded modest cultural exchange agreements with Western countries. There were numer-

ous other signs of a more cooperative Soviet policy, such as the treaty on the Antarctica, the establishment of the hot line between Washington and Moscow, the partial nuclear test ban treaty, the consular treaty, the outer space treaties, the jointly-sponsored nonproliferation treaty, and the agreement on direct air routes between Moscow and Washington. It has been often overlooked that the fields of agreement were of a very specific nature and, in several instances, the agreements were more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the West. Serious political issues have not been settled.

One of the most important efforts in bridge-building was West Germany's initiation of a policy of reconciliation with the East European countries. The West German government gave up a long-standing policy which tried to link the reunification of Germany with a policy of détente in Europe and with disarmament. Although Germans still aspired to a reunited Germany, the German government no longer insisted on immediate reunification as a part of a European accommodation. Perhaps the boldest West German move was directed toward East Germany. Short of recognition, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger suggested more than a dozen areas for a rapprochement between the two German states. Thus, Bonn's policy of bridge-building toward the East European states ran parallel to a policy of reconciliation with East Germany.

Such friendly Western policies toward the East European states were in harmony with a general trend of reconciliation and did not seem to provoke Soviet wrath. In this atmosphere of cozy détente, it was suggested that NATO's military strength was no longer necessary and there was talk of the use of the Atlantic Council as a negotiating body with the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The Atlantic Council meeting in June, 1968, pondered discussions with the East European states on mutual force reductions. Soviet-American relations were espe-

cially cordial because of the jointly sponsored nonproliferation treaty and plans for a summit meeting and nuclear disarmament.

During this period, few observers understood the hard facts of life in the U.S.S.R. Premier Nikita Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization had been followed by re-Stalinization both in foreign and in domestic politics. Under Aleksei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union quickly stepped up its role in Vietnam and began new programs of military expansion in nuclear and conventional weapons at home and in the development of forces in East Europe. The rapid increase in Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean has been enhanced by Soviet access to naval facilities in Syria, Egypt and Algeria. Soviet bloc military aid to Israel was replaced with massive military aid to Arab states under Khrushchev, and was increased under Kosygin and Brezhnev. These developments endangered NATO's vulnerable southern flank.

After 1965, Stalinism was becoming increasingly evident in Soviet domestic affairs. Stalin's picture appeared again on Moscow television screens. The first political show trial since Stalin's death took place in February, 1966, and two writers (Andrei Sinyavski and Yuli Daniel) were imprisoned. The significance of the renewal of the persecution of those Soviet writers and intellectuals who advocated a liberalizing trend has been hardly noticed, let alone properly appraised, in the West.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET POLICY OF INTERVENTION

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred on August 21, 1968, in the midst of the pleasant era of bridge-building. However, this surprise move was not a deviation from the traditional pattern of Soviet policies. It demonstrated once more that the objectives of Soviet foreign policy and the methods of Soviet diplomacy have not changed since Stalin's days.² The invasion of Czechoslovakia was preceded by solemn agreements concluded at Cierna and Bratislava between the Communist regime of Czechoslovakia and the

² See for details the writer's, *The Quest for Peace through Diplomacy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 34-50.

Soviet leaders. Since the Soviet troops could not find the Czechoslovak leaders who allegedly invited them, an article in *Pravda* (September 26, 1968) somewhat belatedly proclaimed a new doctrine. This article asserted that "every Communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement." Moscow asserted that it could intervene within the "socialist commonwealth" if policies in a socialist country would damage "socialism in their own country or the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries or the worldwide workers' movement."

This doctrine (restated by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the U.N. General Assembly on October 3, 1968) means that Moscow feels entitled to intervene whenever it wishes within the geographically undefined "socialist commonwealth." Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and China obviously belong to the "commonwealth." Moreover, the existence of a possible Socialist-Communist coalition government in France or Italy could conceivably be used for the justification of Soviet intervention if Moscow should feel that policies in these socialist countries would damage "the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries." Furthermore, during the Czechoslovak crisis the Soviet government went on to declare that it was entitled to intervene in West Germany on the basis of Article 53, Paragraph 1, and Article 107 of the U.N. Charter.

These examples illustrate that Moscow could easily find ostensible justification for intervention in West Europe if the old continent were to become a power vacuum. A Soviet empire and sphere of influence extending from Vladivostok to the Pyrenees or possibly to Gibraltar and from the Barents Sea to the Arabian Sea would transform the world balance of power and constitute a substantial threat to the security of the United States.

It should be noted that territorial expansion has been a permanent characteristic of Russian foreign policy. Since 1500, Russia expanded whenever a power vacuum arose along her borders. West Europe is one of

the most important industrial areas of the world and the Soviet Union might wish to dominate it before a real showdown with China. The prospect of this magnificent booty might create an almost irresistible desire for the continuation of Russian imperialistic policies, notwithstanding Lenin's statements on national self-determination. The small conventional armies of the European states and the French nuclear force would not be a deterrent without United States support.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

The enclosure of East Central Europe in the Soviet orbit after World War II meant a substantial change not only to the nations in the area but to the whole of Europe. In the past, conquerors from the east and south more than once invaded some East European regions. The Balkan peninsula was part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. But today all the vital areas of East Central Europe belong to the Soviet political sphere. The iron curtain and the wall in Berlin are the ugly realities of a divided Europe. The strategic gates to West Europe are wide open to the Soviet Army. With the Polish and North German plains under Soviet control, there are no serious natural obstacles between the Soviet army and the Atlantic Ocean. This historically unprecedented division of Europe is of momentous significance for Americans, because modern weapons and means of transportation have made the Atlantic Ocean less of a defense line for the United States than the English Channel used to be for Great Britain.

The defense of West Europe against further Soviet expansion is an American as well as a European interest. NATO fulfilled this defense function and provided security for the West European nations. The Soviet Union, in turn, concluded in 1955 a formal military alliance—the Warsaw Pact—with most of the East European states. But the Warsaw Pact is not comparable to NATO. It has been another formulation of tight Soviet control over the East European countries. Their armies were under Soviet control even before 1955. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would

not change this basic situation. In addition to dependence on Soviet armaments, the bilateral military agreements between Moscow and most of the East European states would remain in force even if the Warsaw Pact were to change its form.

In early 1968, the head counts of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces were roughly comparable in the central region of Europe. There were 46 Warsaw Pact divisions (22 Soviet and 24 East European) and 28.66 NATO divisions. Since the NATO divisions have more manpower than the Warsaw Pact divisions, the equation was 900,000 NATO troops versus 960,000 Warsaw Pact troops on the basis of a simple head count. Although the gross comparison of manpower is not a proper evaluation of actual military strength, it gives some indication of the opposing forces.³ Moreover, these total figures include such uncertain factors as the French forces in NATO and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces of questionable political dependability.

The apparent military balance was upset by the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet troops had been increased from 22 divisions to 32 divisions. Twenty-five Soviet ground divisions participated in the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The rapidity of the Soviet military action was impressive and gave NATO planners some food for thought. Even today about 70,000 Soviet soldiers are stationed in Czechoslovakia, and substantial Soviet forces have been permanently deployed near the Bavarian border of the Federal Republic of Germany. The real imbalance is even greater because of the demonstrated Soviet capability of rapid reinforcement from the motherland.

One of the consequences of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was the revitalization of NATO. During the last two decades, few member states except the United States have regularly met their force commitments to NATO. During the last few years it was doubtful if all the NATO states had the

³ See for details, *The Military Balance, 1968-69* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).

⁴ Harlan Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1969, pp. 260-261.

political determination to maintain an adequate defense. The occupation of Czechoslovakia has changed this complacent attitude at least temporarily. Some NATO states have pledged budget increases for military expenditures above those already planned. Twelve countries reported to NATO that they would spend around \$90 billion for defense in the period 1968-1972.⁴ This means that they will use almost five per cent of their Gross National Product for defense. Most European NATO states pledged to fill out under-strength units, to increase stocks of materiel, to improve training and to designate additional forces for assignment to NATO command in time of war. In addition, dates for certain military exercises were advanced and negotiations began for an "on call" naval force to provide additional coverage for emergencies in the Mediterranean.

Although NATO may not have fulfilled all expectations in political, cultural and economic fields, and although Canada has announced the phased reduction of her troop contributions to Europe's defense, none of the member countries have decided to leave the alliance. French Foreign Minister Michel Debré affirmed France's loyalty to NATO in Washington on April 9, 1969, and France participates in the political activities of the Western alliance.

EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS

In March, 1969, the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers called for an all-European conference devoted to European security and cooperation. A unanimous resolution appealed to the nations of Europe to strengthen their efforts for the peace and security of Europe. Subsequently, the Washington meeting of the North Atlantic Council in April, 1969, suggested a step-by-step exploration of the possibility of agreements with the Warsaw Pact powers.

The reference to an all-European conference in the communiqué of the Warsaw Pact powers might be only a propaganda move implying the exclusion of the United States and Canada. Since the Soviet Union is more powerful militarily than the rest of

Europe, without American participation in European affairs there would be no balance between West Europe and the huge Soviet empire.

Although the United States did not seek the responsibility for the defense of Europe, the abandonment of this responsibility would seriously threaten United States security interests and world peace. Without NATO, West Europe would become a huge power vacuum, unless the West European countries could unite and maintain modern weapons systems sufficiently strong to deter the U.S.S.R. However, the chances are remote for the realization of this alternative in the foreseeable future.

A continuing danger remains that decisions in the U.S.S.R. are made by a small group of party leaders, and policy issues are discussed only within the intramural quarters of this oligarchy. The well-disguised power struggle within the Kremlin might swing Soviet policies in any direction. Khrushchev's methods for the elimination of his opponents are cases in point. Sudden changes might become even more likely under the present neo-Stalinist regime if, as apparently is the case, the influence of the Soviet army continues to increase.

Some serious scholars in Western countries (and, in a recent essay, the Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei D. Sakharov⁵) have predicted the convergence of the American and Soviet systems. This may be correct in the long run, but it would be a poor basis for policy-making in Western countries at the present time. While the worldwide restlessness of university students is visible, the intimidated Soviet youth is silent, reflecting the inexorable rigidity of the regime.

MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BRIDGE-BUILDING

In view of the unsettled political problems of Europe and the unreliability and unpredictability of Soviet policies, the continuation of United States military commitments in West

Europe is a strategic and political necessity for the protection of the North Atlantic area and for stability in East-West relations. Since the occupation of Czechoslovakia demonstrated the persistent Soviet mistrust of even a Communist regime, it is not likely that Moscow would consider the withdrawal of Soviet divisions stationed in the Warsaw Pact countries. Thus a reciprocal disengagement does not seem to be in the cards. Even if such a policy should be initiated later, the West must also look to the resurgence of Soviet military and other Soviet actions in the Middle East; the U.S.S.R. regards this area simultaneously as an end in itself and as a vital "flank" of its moves directed into Central and West Europe.

As long as a reciprocal disengagement cannot be undertaken, the West will have to continue patiently the somewhat tarnished and discredited policy of bridge-building. Simultaneously, the West can probe Soviet intentions with proposals for the settlement of specific issues, such as the Western access to Berlin.

The West certainly should try to open as many doors and windows toward the Soviet Union and the East European states as possible. Increased cultural contacts may have significant long-range effects, and in this process the East European countries may play the role of cultural transmission belts toward the Soviet Union. Although development of East-West trade is a factor, it would be unrealistic to believe that increased trade relations alone could influence important political decisions in the Kremlin. In view of Soviet suspicion and hostility toward the West, the emergence of more friendly relations may take a very long time indeed and will be based

(Continued on page 51)

Stephen D. Kertesz, a contributing editor of *Current History*, was Hungarian Minister to Italy in 1947, and was a visiting professor at the Yale Law School from 1948 to 1950. His most recent books are *Nuclear Non-Proliferation* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) and *Quest for Peace through Diplomacy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

⁵ *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1968).

BOOK REVIEWS

CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

EDITED BY JAMES CHACE. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1969. The Reference Shelf, Vol. 40, No. 6. 208 pages and bibliography, \$3.50.)

This volume is a symposium of some 25 articles written by articulate journalists and professional Middle East analysts; the articles originally appeared in such periodicals as *The New Yorker*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Encounter* and *The New York Times Magazine*. The book's usefulness for the scholar and student lies less in the wide range of opinions expressed than in the desirability of bringing many good articles together and thus increasing their accessibility. While many of us may feel that we know the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this volume's worth would have been greatly increased had even one Arab's observations on the ongoing Middle East conflict been included.

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The Johns Hopkins University

CYPRUS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

BY THOMAS W. ADAMS and ALVIN J. COTRELL. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 92 pages, \$2.25.)

This excellent monograph provides a lucid, informative analysis of the geopolitical significance of the problem of Cyprus. In well organized chapters, the authors develop the domestic roots of the Cyprus problem, the policies of the two superpowers, and the outlook for the future. The unresolved and volatile situation in the Middle East, coupled with the accelerating intrusion of the Soviet Union into the area, make Cyprus strategically important to the defense of the West.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS FOR THE 1970s. EDITED BY PAUL SEABURY AND AARON WILDAVSKY. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 212 pages, \$5.95.)

This collection of essays explores the foreign policy problems facing the United States in the next decade as seen by nine members of the faculty at the University of California at Berkeley, plus a member of the Hudson Institute. Their evaluation of our long-range vital interests and our commitments around the world suggests the alternatives open to U.S. policy-makers.

O.E.S.

NAVAL POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS.

I. The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929. BY STEPHEN ROSKILL. (New York: Walker and Company, 1968. 566 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$15.)

Readers seeking a better understanding of United States defense policies and problems in the period between the two world wars will welcome this scholarly and detailed account of naval policy from 1919 to 1929.

O.E.S.

THE WAY WE GO TO WAR. BY MERLO J. PUSEY. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969. 190 pages and index, \$4.95.)

This analysis of the war-making powers of the Congress and the President is a careful examination of the way the nation has been committed to war, its current military commitments, and the constitutional roots of these commitments. Noting that today "Forty-two countries have agreed to join with the United States in some measure of collective defense," this author summarizes the "immensity of the defense obligations assumed by the United States."

O.E.S.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Truman Doctrine

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman sent a message to Congress asking that the United States underwrite the defense of free states against totalitarian regimes. In May, 1947, Congress authorized aid for Greece and Turkey. Excerpts from the Truman message follow:

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in Northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontiers between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other.

Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the Government throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. . . .

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. . . .

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948.

. . . I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey . . . to assist in the tasks of reconstruction. . . . I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. . . .

The Eisenhower Doctrine

After the Suez crisis, President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked Congress for authority to send financial and military aid to any Middle Eastern country threatened by Communist aggression. On March 9, 1957, the Congress passed Public Law 7, 85th Congress in response to the request. Excerpts follow:

Resolved, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any

nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in

the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed force to assist

any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided* that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

Sec. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of the fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. . . .

The North Atlantic Treaty

On April 4, 1949, after months of negotiations, 12 nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, promising mutual assistance in the event of an attack on any one of the signatories. Signatories included the United States, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium and Luxembourg. Excerpts from the treaty text follow:

Art. 2. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Art. 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Art. 4. The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Art. 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe

or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. . . .

Art. 9. The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. . . .

THE U.S. AND EUROPE TODAY

(Continued from page 47)

on pragmatic Soviet assessments of what would benefit the U.S.S.R. in Europe and, ultimately, in the global perspective of China and the Middle East.

The disappearance of the physical and intellectual iron curtain would be a reliable sign of a genuine détente in Europe. The free exchange of ideas, freedom of travel, free circulation of foreign books, newspapers and periodicals would make possible a dialogue between Communist and non-Communist societies. The occupation of Czechoslovakia has demonstrated that there are limits to liberalization within the Soviet security zone. It is a regrettable fact that without meaningful liberalization in the Soviet Union itself, liberalization in the East European countries has very strict limits. If some day, the free exchange of ideas extends from the English Channel to Vladivostok, mankind will live in a much safer world and the end of the United States military commitment in Europe will be in sight.

Meanwhile, the West can facilitate the development of détente through the unification of West Europe and a cautious dialogue with the East European countries aside from the U.S.S.R.

The European states, divided and left alone, cannot be serious negotiating powers against the Soviet Union. Therefore, Atlantic co-operation, NATO's defense system and the creation of a political authority in West Europe are of primary importance. In the future, the North Atlantic Council should be used for the preparation of an overall European settlement which would make possible the withdrawal of foreign forces from European countries. A politically united, militarily strong, and economically affluent West Europe, supported by the Atlantic Alliance, would be in a strong negotiating position toward the Soviet Union and gradually could take over most, if not all, of Europe's defense burden. Such developments would be milestones that would lead toward genuine dé-

tente. Let us hope that the Atlantic nations will rise to the challenge.

THE U.S. IN WORLD WAR II

(Continued from page 17)

THE MIDDLE EAST

It is remarkable how little the Middle East figured in United States thought and policy-making during the war. At the Placentia meeting of August, 1941, the Americans wrote off the Middle East as "a liability from which the British should withdraw." United States troops fought against Germany in considerable numbers in Tunisia, but this was on the very fringes of the Middle East; they were stationed in Morocco and Algeria, and to a very minor extent in Egypt. An American force was also located for several years in the "Persian corridor." The name suggests its function, which was to safeguard supply lines to the Soviet Union, and to a minor extent to safeguard the oil wells.

The degree to which the United States gave priority to Europe during the Second World War is eloquently indicated by the military statistics. The United States dead and missing in the war for the European and Mediterranean theaters totalled 170,000; for Asia and the Pacific, 50,000. All classes of United States casualties (including the wounded) for the European theater totalled 586,628; for the Mediterranean, 175,107; for the Pacific, 157,938.

These enormous exertions and losses were the earnest of a commitment which was, in fact, going to prove virtually continuous after 1941. The wartime phase of participation in the European war without a formal treaty of alliance led naturally to a formal treaty in 1949—the North Atlantic Treaty. In this treaty, the United States guaranteed the security of West Europe, which has now enjoyed a quarter of a century of peace and growing prosperity. Although different incidents or different leaders in the United States might have altered the detail of events, United States involvement in Europe in World War II had all the hallmarks of an inevitable and irreversible historical process.

THE U.S. AND EUROPE TO 1918

(Continued from page 7)

United States could stay out of the war if the Germans were losing, but that if a German victory appeared probable, then American entry would be inevitable. This seems to have been Wilson's real view, for at a White House conference in the spring of 1919, in reply to a direct question from Senator Porter J. McCumber of North Dakota, the President stated bluntly that the United States would have entered the war even if Germany had committed no act of war and no act of injustice against its citizens.

However, publicly Wilson based United State entry into the war on the grounds of violated neutral rights. Most Americans were still close to the decades of American Continentalism and failed to see the real reasons why relative non-involvement had been possible during those decades. They were suspicious of "power politics" and resisted the idea that United States security resided in a balance of power. It would take the hard experience of the following decades to convince most Americans that European and world "power politics" affected them vitally, and that this had been true, in one way or another, throughout all their history.

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON YEARS

(Continued from page 35)

limitations upon East German travel in Europe. When the NATO Council met in June in Iceland for its semiannual meeting, it announced that NATO would resist East German restrictions upon West German travel to West Berlin. The Council also appealed for a reduction of military forces by the Soviet Union and its allies, and viewed with disfavor Soviet naval power in the eastern Mediterranean where, throughout the year, Israel's relations with her neighbors had been filled with raids and border incidents despite United Nations efforts to maintain a cease-fire.

Soviet intervention against Czechoslovakia's new political liberalism resulted in the occupation of that nation by Warsaw Pact powers on August 20 and 21. The United Nations Security Council condemned the occupation and NATO looked with concern upon the implications of the drastic Soviet action. At the 23d General Assembly of the United Nations in October, the United States warned that any Soviet attempt to intervene in West Germany would cause retaliation from NATO. The NATO Council of Ministers met in November, a month early, in the light of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the continuing problems of Israel and her neighbors. The Council gave special warnings to the U.S.S.R. that intervention in either Europe or the Mediterranean would cause a "crisis." It criticized the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and its implications for troop reductions in Europe and East-West relations. The United States, Great Britain and France renewed a pledge to defend Berlin, and plans were set in motion to improve the conventional military arms status of NATO. The United States announced it would send additional troops to Europe, and Secretary of State Rusk included Austria and Yugoslavia within the areas of NATO's security interests, despite the fact that they were not members.

As President Johnson prepared to leave office, the crises in the Middle East and in Czechoslovakia had caused a serious deterioration of what had been the easing of United States and Soviet tensions. The basic military and foreign policy commitments of the United States were rejuvenated and restated: to maintain the security of West Berlin and West Germany, to resist Soviet incursions into West Europe and the Middle East, and to search for a solution of the Middle Eastern problem. Furthermore, in the nuclear nonproliferation agreement, the United States was essentially pledged to aid a nonnuclear power if it came under nuclear attack. How to maintain these commitments and keep the balance of peace in Europe were problems for the new administration of President Richard Nixon.

THE INTERWAR YEARS

(Continued from page 12)

thorized to help protect convoys bound for England. Enemy ships were seized in United States ports; German and Italian assets were frozen and their consulates were closed.

Hitler changed the nature of the war in July, 1941, by invading Russia; thus an enemy became an ally. Division in the United States was intensified by this act; isolationists advocated letting the two nations exhaust themselves against each other. At this time the Selective Service Act came up for renewal in Congress and, despite the need for training men, tremendous opposition arose. The act was renewed by the margin of a single vote.

In August, Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met off the coast of Newfoundland and issued the Atlantic Charter for the postwar world. The Charter pledged liberation of oppressed peoples, freer trade, economic collaboration, peace with justice for all, disarmament and a "wide and more permanent system of general security."

There seems little doubt that Roosevelt wanted the United States to enter the war against Germany by the fall of 1941, because he believed that Germany and Italy could not be overcome by the Allies without United States participation. This was the situation when the Japanese struck in December.

THE EISENHOWER ERA

(Continued from page 30)

ably was suffering a severe jolt at home by the revelation of the penetration of Soviet space, demanded an apology. Eisenhower refused, and the conference fell through.

These had been years of crisis, of thaw and chill in the cold war. War, and even a serious confrontation, had been avoided. The military commitments of the United States within Europe remained as firm as ever, although a "new look" had given rather more emphasis to nuclear retaliation and defense than to reliance on conventional forces. Military commitments in the Middle East in-

creased. On the other hand, Hungary had shown some weakness in United States commitments—or some lack of wisdom in holding out false hopes. And Suez had raised doubts about the efficacy of NATO and the United States willingness to counter threats of nuclear attack against Europe.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND NATO

(Continued from page 23)

States continued to pursue bilateral military aid programs.

Throughout the Truman administration, the Soviet Union and the United States were rivals for ascendancy in the Middle East as dwindling British and French power in the area created a vacuum. The record of the Truman years reveals that the immediate gains of the United States outweighed those of the Soviet Union. The United States and its Western allies succeeded in keeping the Soviets physically out of the Middle East by frustrating Soviet designs on Turkey and Iran. In addition, local Communist movements in the Middle Eastern countries remained weak—a remarkable circumstance for an area close to the U.S.S.R. and burdened with depressed conditions and general instability. In contrast to its policy in West Europe, the United States did not try to build up an on-site force capable of preventing the Soviet Union from overrunning the Middle East in the event of war.

The military policies of the Truman administration involved sharp breaks with the American past. Its response to militant Russian communism brought about a major revolution in United States foreign and military policies. In the Truman Doctrine and subsequent policies, nonintervention and the tradition of avoiding entangling alliances were abandoned. New paths were broken with the adoption of peacetime conscription and a wartime military budget, without which the administration's foreign military commitments could not have been honored. The military policies rested upon a solid foundation of party and public support.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of May, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

May 26—The 1969 session of CENTO adjourns in Iran. The meeting, attended by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, has focused on problems in the Middle East.

Council of Europe

May 6—The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, ending a 2-day meeting in London, adopts a resolution warning Greece that she may be expelled from the council because her military regime violates the fundamental freedoms of her citizens.

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)

May 10—*The New York Times* reports that at a closed meeting in Moscow April 20-26, the Soviet bloc nations agreed to coordinate their economic plans in the 5-year period beginning in 1971. They will make their currencies freely convertible within the bloc.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

May 12—Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Netherlands minister to the Common Market, announces that consideration of Great Britain's membership in the Common Market will be postponed until after the French and the West German elections.

Latin America

May 5—The Mixed Commission of the Andean Group begins meeting in Carta-

gna, Colombia, as representatives of Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela open discussions on the possibility of forming a regional common market.

May 17—Ministers of foreign relations, economy and finance of 20 Latin American countries meeting at Vina del Mar, Chile, adopt an 18-page document proposing profound changes in their economic and political relations with the U.S.

May 27—A common market agreement is signed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. All internal tariffs among the 5 countries will be abolished by 1980.

International Monetary Crisis

(See Germany, Federal Republic of)

Middle East Crisis

May 1—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, speaking at a May Day rally, declares that Egyptian planes will attack Israeli civilian areas if Israel continues her raids on Egypt.

May 4—in southern Jordan, Israeli planes attack an Arab guerrilla camp.

May 5—Speaking to the *Knesset* (parliament), Israeli Premier Golda Meir declares that "signed peace treaties between Israel and each of the neighboring states" are the only acceptable sequel to the cease-fire agreement of 1967.

May 8—The leader of the Palestinian commandos, Yasir Arafat, confers in Beirut with Lebanese President Charles Helou and other leaders.

May 9—Israeli officials disclose that for the past year Israeli commandos have been crossing into Jordan to lay mines and ambush Arab units.

May 21—Israeli army spokesmen report that 3 Egyptian MIG-21 jets have been destroyed in a dogfight over the Suez Canal.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

May 28—Canadian Defense Minister Leo A. J. Cadieux says Canada's plans to reduce her NATO forces are not negotiable.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

May 16—Six of the 8 member nations send military representatives to Bangkok, Thailand, where discussions of defense plans are being held. France has not sent a representative, and Pakistan has sent only an observer.

United Nations

(See also *Middle East Crisis*)

May 9—U.N. Secretary General U Thant, addressing a meeting on the Second United Nations Development Decade, warns that the world must solve the problems of arms control, pollution and population growth in the next decade.

War in Vietnam

May 8—in Paris, the Vietcong delegation presents a 10-point program providing an "overall solution" to the war in Vietnam. The proposal calls for the unconditional, unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, free elections, and an eventual coalition government in South Vietnam.

May 9—U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers declares that the Vietcong peace proposal will be studied "carefully in the hope that it represents a serious response to the proposals put forward by South Vietnam and the United States"; however, he cautions that "it contains some clearly unacceptable proposals. . . ."

The South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry announces that it is ready to open talks privately or at the Paris peace talks on the exchange of prisoners of war, on restoring

the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam and on reinstating the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

May 10—It is disclosed that a report by a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese study team has concluded that after a cease-fire, South Vietnam could achieve economic self-sufficiency in a decade with \$2.5 billion in foreign assistance.

May 12—Allied military officers report that enemy activity has intensified in the last few days. In Saigon, terrorist attacks cause the deaths of 5 persons; 100 are injured.

May 20—On the 11th assault in 10 days, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces capture a peak in the Ashau Valley.

May 25—The chief delegate of the National Liberation Front to the Paris Peace talks, Tran Buu Kiem, tells a *New York Times* reporter that the N.L.F. looks forward to normal and friendly relations with the U.S. after the Vietnamese War is over.

May 28—A speech by President Nguyen Van Thieu, stating that any peace settlement must conform to the present South Vietnamese constitution, seems to reject an interim coalition government and special elections. Both these propositions have been mentioned by U.S. officials as possibilities for negotiation in Paris.

ARGENTINA

May 19—Four Argentine national universities are closed by the authorities to stem an outbreak of student agitation which has already caused two deaths.

May 22—The city of Rosario is placed under military control after thousands of students rout the local police.

May 23—Union representatives of the nation's 3-million labor force vote to join students in a nation-wide general strike on a date to be set later.

A general strike virtually paralyzes Rosario. New street violence is also reported in other cities.

May 24—The Army warns it will restore the death penalty in Argentina if any troops or government officials are killed in the riot-

- ing. The death penalty was abolished in Argentina in 1916.
- May 28—A state of limited seige is imposed as student unrest continues. A general strike has been called for May 30.
- May 30—Despite government warnings, a nation-wide strike closes most heavy industry and halts most transportation.

BOLIVIA

- May 31—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller cuts short his visit to avoid violence from thousands of protesting students.

BRAZIL

- May 1—The Brazilian government announces an increase in the minimum wage and the creation of a social security program for 20 million rural workers.
- May 9—President Artur da Costa e Silva uses his special powers to decree the retirement of eight judges. In the last month he has forced the retirement of 67 professors, 12 diplomats and 31 employees of the Foreign Ministry.

CAMBODIA

- May 13—Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk explains his refusal to reestablish diplomatic ties with the U.S.; relations were broken in May, 1965, following charges of violations of Cambodia's borders by U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. Sihanouk says that U.S. President Richard Nixon's statement on April 16, 1969, recognizing Cambodia's borders, was invalidated by a subsequent U.S. State Department remark that the borders were "vague."

CANADA

(See *Intl. NATO*)

CHILE

- May 21—In his annual state of the nation message to Congress, President Eduardo Frei Montalva indicates that Chile intends

to obtain at least part ownership of the Anaconda copper mines.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

- May 10—Reports from Hong Kong describe a government-sponsored report recommending a basic 9-year course of education for Chinese students. Elementary schooling would be reduced to 5 years and middle schooling to 4 years. The report did not mention university training.

- May 12—The government accepts a Soviet proposal to reinstitute talks by the joint border commission to discuss recent armed clashes at the Ussuri River border.

COSTA RICA

- May 1—Nearly 2,500 persons cheer New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller as he arrives in San Jose, Costa Rica, on his fact-finding mission for President Richard Nixon. Violence erupts outside the presidential palace as he meets with President José Joaquin Trejos.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- May 6—The presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party announces the imposition of new tight controls over newspapers, radio and television.

- May 15—The government closes 5 periodicals which are said to deviate from the ideological line dictated by the party.

- May 19—The Czechoslovak Defense Ministry announces the start of joint Czech-Soviet military training exercises somewhere in Czechoslovakia.

- May 22—The Communist party threatens a ban on the nation-wide student union. Students are still protesting the new conservatism enforced by Soviet orders.

- May 31—Party leader Gustav Husak reveals that "opportunistic elements" including former Deputy Premier Ota Sik have been purged from the Central Committee.

ECUADOR

May 29—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller is greeted by student violence in Quito.

EL SALVADOR

May 13—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller arrives in San Salvador on his fact-finding mission and meets with President Fidel Sánchez Hernández.

FRANCE

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of*)

May 2—Interim President Alain Poher sets June 1 as the date for elections to replace retired President Charles de Gaulle.

May 5—The French Communist party nominates Jacques Duclos as its candidate in the forthcoming presidential election.

The Socialist party nominates Gaston Defferre, Mayor of Marseilles, as its presidential candidate.

May 9—in a campaign statement to the Gaullist party, its candidate, Georges Pompidou, pledges to change Charles de Gaulle's foreign and domestic policies. He favors greater unity in Europe and a more powerful Parliament.

May 12—Acting President Alain Poher announces his Centrist party candidacy for the presidency.

May 15—Former Premier Pierre Mendès-France announces he will run for the office of Premier on the ticket of Socialist presidential candidate Gaston Defferre.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

May 8—Continuing speculation against the French franc sends hundreds of millions of francs into West Germany. Speculators are gambling that Germany will be forced to revalue the mark upward.

May 9—After long debate, the federal Cabinet decides not to revalue the mark upward. The government says its decision is "final, unequivocal and for eternity."

May 12—The decision not to revalue the mark causes some funds to be returned to France and Great Britain. Speculators are believed to have lost heavily in the recent transactions, according to West German government officials.

May 13—The Cabinet outlines plans for fighting an inflation that is threatened by its refusal to revalue the currency.

May 19—West Germany's willingness to open discussions with Poland on frontier questions is stated by Foreign Minister Willy Brandt.

GREECE

May 4—Liberals and rightists who oppose the military regime are urged to unite under the leadership of former Premier Constantine Caramanlis.

May 11—A new series of curbs is imposed on Greek labor unions by the military regime.

May 14—A military tribunal condemns 12 Greeks to prison for terms ranging from 8 months to life. They are charged with attempting to overthrow the regime.

May 17—A new series of political trials opens in Athens. The military regime announces that six mass trials are to be held before the Athens Special Military Court.

May 28—The military government arrests 10 retired top-level officers, charging them with a plot to overthrow the government.

May 31—37 Greeks are convicted of conspiring against the government; arrests continue.

GUATEMALA

May 13—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller meets with President Julio César Méndez Montenegro. Guatemalan newspapers criticize Rockefeller for spending only three and a half hours in Guatemala.

HAITI

May 23—Reports from Port-au-Prince describe President François Duvalier as recovering from a heart attack suffered in the past month.

HONDURAS

May 14—As New York's Governor Rockefeller lunches with President Osvaldo López Arellano, 500 students mass outside the presidential palace. Police shoot and kill one student as they clash with the demonstrators.

INDIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

May 3—Zakir Husain, President of India, dies at the age of 72. Vice President V. V. Giri assumes the office of Acting President. Election for a new President by a majority vote of the legislature must be held within six months. The office is largely ceremonial.

IRAN

(See also *Iraq*)

May 17—A border dispute between Iran and Iraq is causing demonstrations in Iran. Iranians in Iraq are being deported or jailed.

IRAQ

(See also *Iran*)

May 18—The Ba'ath party ruling Iraq denounces the illegal ambitions of Iranian fishermen in "Iraqi" waters. The Iraqi government has executed 36 persons as "spies" in the past 3 months. They claim that the spies are trained in Iran and are paid by the U.S. and Israel.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

LAOS

May 2—A large cache of arms belonging to Pathet Lao guerrillas is captured by government troops in the Plaine des Jarres region.

May 3—The government reports a victory over North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in the Plaine des Jarres.

May 27—Laotian and U.S. bombers attack guerrilla forces 20 miles west of the North Vietnamese border.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

May 1—Palestinian guerrillas besieging a police post in southern Lebanon are driven off by the Lebanese army.

May 11—Lebanese leaders hold discussions with Yasir Arafat, chief of the Palestinian commandos. The commandos demand the right to operate from Lebanon against Israel. The Lebanese government continues to forbid the terrorist raids.

MALAYSIA

May 11—Returns from a general election show the government Alliance party losing 23 seats, including 3 held by cabinet members.

May 13—Rioting between Malaysians and Chinese results in 20 deaths and many injuries. The riots were touched off by the withdrawal of the Chinese Association from the coalition Cabinet of Prime Minister Abdul Rahman.

May 14—The Prime Minister suspends the constitution and imposes a curfew.

May 16—Unlimited powers to suppress rioting are vested in the Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Razak.

May 21—Curfew restrictions are relaxed in Kuala Lumpur, the capital city.

MEXICO

May 12—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and 12 of his advisers meet with members of the Mexican Council on Foreign Trade to hear demands for preferential trade treatment from the U.S.

NICARAGUA

May 16—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller arrives in Managua on his fact-finding tour for President Nixon. Student demonstrators trample and burn an American flag and march with signs that read, "Rocky, go home."

PAKISTAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

May 6—Five East Pakistanis are appointed to high government posts by President Yahya Khan. The top administrative position, chief secretary of the province, goes to an East Pakistani, S. M. Shaiful Azam, for the first time in Pakistan's 21-year history.

PANAMA

May 3—It is reported that Brigadier General Omar Torrijos, commandant of the National Guard and Panama's strongman, said in an interview that he interpreted the U.S. loan recently granted to Panama as a "show of confidence" in the present military regime. It is the first U.S. loan to be approved for Panama since the military regime came to power last October.

May 19—Arriving in Panama, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller reminds the military junta of its pledge to restore democracy to Panama. Torrijos says he has personally assured Rockefeller there will be free elections in Panama next year.

PERU

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

May 5—It is announced that the Peruvian government has granted a 5-year exploration concession to the American-owned Peruvian Gulf Oil Company.

May 17—The government announces it plans a gradual nationalization of the country's telecommunication services.

May 23—Premier Ernesto Montague announces Peru is expelling the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force missions in Peru and that Peru will reject the forthcoming visit of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. The announcement follows the decision of the U.S. to suspend military aid to Peru.

PORTUGAL

May 13—204 Socialists issue a manifesto urging a democratic coalition against the government in the fall Assembly elections.

RHODESIA

May 18—University College students in Salisbury campaign against a proposed constitution which would firmly entrench white minority rule in Rhodesia. A referendum on the constitution is expected late in June.

SUDAN

May 25—The government is overthrown by a group of military officers. The officers pledge to work more closely with the U.A.R. and "other progressive Arab states."

May 27—Premier Abubakr Awadallah, leader of the military faction that seized the government 2 days ago, recognizes East Germany and condemns Israel.

SYRIA

May 30—A new, more broadly representative 25-man Cabinet is headed by President and Premier Nuredin al-Attassi.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *China*)

May 1—The traditional May Day parade has no military exhibits for the first time since World War II.

May 8—It is reported that training exercises on the border of Communist China are being held by Soviet tank and reconnaissance troops.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

UNITED KINGDOM

May 1—The majority Unionist party of Northern Ireland chooses Major James D. Chichester-Clark as Northern Ireland's fifth Prime Minister to succeed Terence O'Neill. Chichester-Clark pledges to calm political and religious violence.

May 5—Following the retirement of French President Charles de Gaulle, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces that

Great Britain will renew her attempts to enter the European Common Market.

May 13—British Home Secretary James Callaghan is dismissed from the Cabinet following his refusal to support a government bill to bring some control over the frequent wildcat strikes which are costing the British economy millions of pounds.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

(See *Race Relations*)

Economy

May 5—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in April the rate of unemployment among Negroes, particularly Negro women, increased sharply; the unemployment rate for whites remained low and unchanged.

May 22—The Labor Department reports that in April, consumer prices rose .6 of 1 per cent; in the last 3 months, consumer prices have been rising at an annual rate of 7.6 per cent, a faster rate than any full year since 1951.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

May 1—In a Senate speech, the senior Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Vermont Senator George D. Aiken, urges the administration to start an "orderly withdrawal" of U.S. forces from Vietnam at once.

May 2—Pennsylvania Senator Hugh Scott, assistant Senate Republican leader, urges the U.S. to withdraw "a substantial number" of troops from Vietnam.

The U.S. and West Germany reach "substantial" agreement on a long-range financial formula under which the West German government will cover most of the annual dollar cost of stationing 200,000 U.S. troops in West Germany. Final talks will be resumed in June.

May 9—New York Senator Jacob Javits (R.)

charges that President Richard Nixon is following "the sterile and unsuccessful approach" of the Johnson administration to the war in Vietnam.

May 11—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller talks to President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida, before flying to Mexico City to start his fact-finding mission in Latin America.

May 12—The President confers at the White House with General Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam.

May 14—In Washington, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew warns that the U.S. should not withdraw from South Vietnam too hastily "just because the burden has become too costly for you."

In a nation-wide televised address, President Nixon suggests that the U.S. and North Vietnam should schedule a phased mutual withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam over a 12-month period. This is the President's first report to the U.S. public on the war in Vietnam.

May 20—The White House reveals that the President will meet with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu on Midway Island on June 8.

May 24—After completing high-level talks with Indian officials in New Delhi, Secretary of State William P. Rogers arrives in Lahore; he tells Pakistani officials that Pakistan's arms needs are "under review" in the U.S.

The State Department says that it will honor Peru's request that the U.S. withdraw from Peru 41 U.S. officers and servicemen in its military missions; it regrets Peru's unwillingness to accept the visit of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. (See also *Peru*.)

May 28—President Nixon asks Congress to appropriate \$2.6 billion for economic and military foreign aid in fiscal 1970; this is the smallest overall request in the program's history.

Government

May 5—The Treasury announces that it has

imposed "countervailing duties" on imports of steel products from Italy to offset Italian subsidies on these items.

May 6—In a message to Congress, the President suggests a government food program at an eventual annual cost of \$1 billion. It is estimated that this campaign against hunger will cost \$270 million at first.

A lengthy critical report on the Safeguard missile defense system is issued under the sponsorship of Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.); it describes the Safeguard system as unworkable.

May 10—The House Ethics Committee makes public reports by members of the House on their outside financial interests.

May 13—The President asks Congress to set up a lottery to replace the current system of selecting draftees for military service; 19-year-olds would be subject to call first.

May 14—99 Senators file reports on their outside financial interests.

The Department of Labor makes public details of the largest single job-training contract ever negotiated—a contract with the Chrysler Corporation for \$13.8 million to train 4,450 hardcore unemployed over the next 2 years.

May 19—The President announces that he plans to name New Hampshire lawyer John N. Nassikas as chairman of the Federal Power Commission; he intends to renominate Aubrey Wagner as chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

May 27—The President asks Congress to turn the Post Office Department into a self-sustaining government-owned corporation administered by a 9-man board of directors, over which Congress would have only limited control.

May 29—The President establishes the Environmental Quality Council, a Cabinet-level agency, to study pollution problems.

Labor

May 1—Because of strikes in 6 states, the General Motors Corporation reveals that car and truck production fell 5.3 per cent in April, 1969, compared to April, 1968.

No progress toward settling the strikes is reported.

South Carolina Governor Robert E. McNair declares a state of emergency in Charleston because of the continuing strike of Negro hospital workers at the State Medical College Hospital and Charleston County Hospital; a curfew is also imposed. More than 400 workers seek recognition of their union plus pay increases and an end to discriminatory practices. South Carolina law prohibits state institutions from negotiating with labor unions.

May 16—Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz reveals that he has relaxed the proposed federal industrial health and safety standards for the nation's coal miners; the original standards were proposed by former Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, and were delayed for restudy by the Nixon administration.

May 25—Chicago school teachers end their strike which began May 22; this was the first such strike in the city's history.

May 26—An alliance of the United Automobile Workers and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters is formally inaugurated.

Military Policy

May 5—The Department of Defense admits that its estimate of the cost of the Safeguard missile defense system was understated by \$1.2 billion—the cost of the nuclear warheads for the system. Including the cost of the nuclear warheads, the system will cost some \$7.8 billion.

May 6—Navy Secretary John H. Chafee announces that the Navy will take "no disciplinary action" against any member of the espionage ship *Pueblo*; he overrules a Navy court of inquiry recommendation that two *Pueblo* officers be courtmartialed. (See *Korean Crisis, Current History*, Mar., 1968, p. 177.)

May 8—at a public hearing of a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Brigadier General James A. Hebler pledges that the Army will delay until May 13 its decision on shipping poison gas by rail across the coun-

try for disposal. The Army proposes to ship 27,000 tons of World War II cylinders containing the gas to Earle, New Jersey, for reloading onto 4 Liberty ships which will be sunk 250 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean. Critics charge that the Army plan is a "very hazardous operation" because of the danger to human and animal life if the cylinders leak.

May 14—*The New York Times* reports that in a confidential report, the Government Accounting Office has charged the Army with accelerating the \$1.3 billion Sheridan armored vehicle program in May, 1966, to avoid "adverse political and budgetary impacts," although it was not sure that ammunition for the vehicle's guns would work. It reportedly charges that for the same reason—to avoid review by the Bureau of the Budget and civilian analysts in the Defense Department—the Army also spent \$250 million on a new version of the still unusable M-60 heavy tank.

In hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright (D.) charges that although the Department of Defense promised last month that it would not deploy the missile defense system until it had been authorized to do so by Congress, it is already proceeding with production of some items that will be used in the system. Fulbright says the Pentagon attitude "borders on irresponsibility toward the legislative branch."

May 19—Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) says that the Department of Defense has temporarily withdrawn its request for permission to ship 27,000 tons of poison gas across the country.

May 20—The Army drops court martial charges against the last 3 of 8 soldiers at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, who were charged in March with "the serious offense" of speaking publicly against the war in Vietnam. The men are to receive "undesirable" discharges.

May 21—Three Army officials admit to the House Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources that due to an accident,

6,000 sheep in Skull Valley, Utah, were killed in early 1968 by nerve gas being tested at the Dugway Proving Ground. During the investigations in 1968, the Army repeatedly denied this charge.

Politics

(See also *Race Relations*)

May 14—The International Ladies Garment Workers Union ends its connection with the Liberal party; 25 years ago, it was one of the founders of the party. The I.L.G.-W.U. criticizes the Liberal party's endorsement of New York Mayor John Lindsay for reelection.

May 15—Twenty-four Republican U.S. Senators announce support for Lindsay in his campaign for reelection; on June 17, Lindsay will face Republican State Senator John Marchi in a fight for the Republican nomination.

Race Relations

May 4—James Forman, representing the National Black Economic Development Conference, intrudes into the altar area of New York City's Riverside Church and halts services while he reads demands for reparations to Negroes from religious organizations; his group is asking the nation's churches for some \$500 million.

May 6—Howard Lee is elected mayor of Chapel Hill, North Carolina; he will be the first Negro mayor of a predominantly white North Carolina city in the 20th century.

May 13—In Fayette, Mississippi, Charles Evers wins the Democratic nomination for mayor; victory is also assured for more than 12 other Negroes in the state's Democratic primary elections.

Science and Space

May 11—A spokesman for the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) reveals that NASA is considering relaxing the precautions to be taken against the possible spread of alien organisms that might be brought back from the moon by

the Apollo 11 spaceflight. The new plan calls for "airing out" the Apollo 11 space-men in the ocean and then quarantining them.

May 18—The Apollo 10 spacecraft is launched toward the moon with 3 space-men aboard.

May 26—The Apollo 10 astronauts land safely and accurately after a successful flight; they orbited the moon 31 times and descended to within 9 miles of the moon's surface.

Student Unrest

May 1—A district court judge in East Cambridge, Mass., fines 169 defendants for criminal trespass in the occupation of a Harvard University building April 9, 1969. All but 25 of those fined are Harvard University students.

After warrants for their arrest have been signed in the State Supreme Court, some 100 student demonstrators at Columbia University leave 2 buildings they had occupied.

May 2—The faculty, students and administrative staff of Amherst College ask President Nixon to "address more effectively, massively and persistently the major social and foreign problems of our society"; otherwise, they warn, campus turmoil will continue.

May 9—at Dartmouth College, 45 young men and women are sentenced to 30-day jail terms and are fined \$100 each for refusing to leave a college building in response to a court order.

May 10—President Nixon, Vice President Spiro Agnew and other key officials discuss the problem of campus disorder.

May 12—Some 50 white and black seminar-ians occupy a building and close Union Theological Seminary to support James Forman's demand for reparations from the nation's churches and synagogues. (See also Race Relations.)

May 13—The trustees of Columbia University vote to abolish R.O.T.C. at the university.

Twenty students are indicted on arson

charges because of their alleged criminal activities at Brooklyn College.

May 17—Students riot at Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It is estimated that some 1,000 of the 8,000 students are involved.

May 18—Six persons are arrested and several are injured on the 4th day of protests at the University of California's Berkeley campus.

May 21—Faculty members at the University of California at Berkeley boycott classes to protest a National Guard tear gas attack that swept the campus May 20. Since May 15, there have been more than 100 injuries on both sides; 1 bystander has died of gunshot wounds inflicted by a sheriff's deputy; hundreds have been arrested.

May 23—in Greensboro, North Carolina, police and National Guardsmen use tear gas to disperse armed students who have been firing on them since May 21; unrest began in an all-Negro high school and spread to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, a Negro college. One student has been killed and five policemen have been wounded. The university has been closed and a curfew has been declared in Greensboro.

May 26—The Faculty Senate of City College (New York) begins a careful study of the dual admissions proposal tentatively adopted May 23 after discussions between representatives of the college and Negro and Puerto Rican student protesters; the tentative agreement provides that by the fall of 1970, half the freshman class will be admitted from slum neighborhoods without regard to academic standing. The college has been closed sporadically in the past few weeks because of continuing violence.

Supreme Court

May 4—*Life* magazine publishes an article charging that in 1966 Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas accepted, and later re-turned, a \$20,000 fee from the family foundation of Louis E. Wolfson, an indus-

trialist subsequently imprisoned for stock manipulation. Fortas was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1965.

May 14—Abe Fortas resigns from the Supreme Court although he maintains that there was no "wrongdoing" on his part in his relationship with Louis Wolfson. Yesterday, steps were taken in the House of Representatives that might have led to impeachment proceedings against Fortas.

May 19—The Court rules unanimously that the federal marijuana tax laws violate the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination.

The Court rules 6 to 2 that the federal government is not liable for damages by federal troops to private buildings during a riot.

May 21—President Nixon names Warren Earl Burger, a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as Chief Justice of the U.S. Burger has taken a strong stand for law and order and is known as a moderate on civil rights cases.

May 22—At a news conference, the President says that because of the controversy over Justice Abe Fortas, he will not appoint a close personal or political friend to the Fortas vacancy.

May 23—Justice William Douglas resigns as president and director of the Albert Parvin Foundation, a \$12,000-a-year post.

Trust Territories

May 1—Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the Interior, flies to the Pacific Trust Territory of Micronesia, with suggestions for stronger self-government and economic aid for the islands. The territory, made up of 2,141 small islands covering 3 million miles, was placed under U.S. jurisdiction after World War II through a trustee arrangement with the U.N. Under terms of the arrangement, the U.S. may establish military bases there.

VATICAN, THE

May 1—Final ceremonies are held in St. Peter's Basilica at the end of the 4-day

consistory creating 33 new cardinals, the largest group ever elevated at one time.

May 2—Pope Paul VI names John Cardinal Wright, a U.S. bishop, to head the Congregation of the Clergy, providing for supervision of the welfare of priests.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

VIETNAM, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

May 7—Four of the political parties of South Vietnam agree to name their anti-Communist coalition front the "Social Democratic Nationalist Front." They will meet May 25. The organization is being formed at the request of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

May 25—The pro-government political coalition meets in Saigon. The organization will be directed by President Nguyen Van Thieu. The organization is made up of conservative centrists and Roman Catholic refugees from North Vietnam. Buddhists and liberal groups have refused to join the organization.

YEMEN

May 1—President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani states that the 6-year old civil war between royalists and republicans has ended. There has been no fighting since December, 1968.

YUGOSLAVIA

May 11—President Tito, in a speech before a Yugoslav crowd, declares that Yugoslavia does not recognize the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty which was formulated following the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year.

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